Sugar Cane, Software and Fashion: Public-Private Collaboration in Argentina by Bisang, Roberto Oscar et al.
129
4Sugar Cane, Software and Fashion: Public-Private 
Collaboration in Argentina
Roberto Bisang, Andrea González, Juan Carlos Hallak,  
Andrés López, Daniela Ramos, and Ricardo Rozemberg
the design and imPlementation of Productive develoPment Policies Pose 
challenges for Policymakers, esPecially in emerging economies. 
Although pervasive market and coordination failures pave the way for pol-
icy intervention, the instruments adopted have often been less success-
ful than expected. This is because policymakers generally lack important 
pieces of information and do not have access to rigorous evaluations of 
current and previous programs, and because public sector capacity is fre-
quently weak. Moreover, there are often coordination problems between 
different agencies or levels of government. The emergence of rent-seeking 
and free-riding behaviors, agency captures, and corruption also explains 
the negative outcomes. The lack of resilience of public policies in light of 
frequent staff changes in the public sector and cyclical fiscal crises also 
hinders the effectiveness of productive development policies.
Public-private collaboration (PPC) schemes may help to alleviate 
some of the factors that lead to problems in the design, implementa-
tion, and monitoring of productive development policies insofar as they 
may facilitate information exchange and coordination among the vari-
ous agents involved, address some government failures, generate more 
transparency, and contribute to the resilience of those policies. PPC may 
range from informal consultations with the private sector to that sector’s 
full involvement in the policy design, execution, and monitoring stages, 
130 TWO TO TANGO
including schemes such as the participation of the private sector in advi-
sory and supervisory bodies, technological and productive alliances, 
deliberation councils, and other arrangements.
In recent decades, Argentina has implemented a large and var-
ied number of productive development policies in the context of differ-
ent economic regimes. After the dismantling of the import-substitution 
regime, productive development policies became less significant, and 
during the 1990s they were mostly aimed at solving market failures under 
a horizontal approach. Following the economic crisis of 2001, productive 
development policies regained their relevance (in an international sce-
nario that was friendlier to the adoption of such policies). New horizon-
tal instruments were created, resources allocated to existing ones often 
increased, and some new sectoral and targeted policies were launched.
In spite of a sort of renaissance of productive development policies, 
PPC schemes are still not very common, as noted by Baruj, Kosacoff, 
and Ramos (2009). These authors point out that the weak interaction 
between the public and private sectors is to some extent the result of the 
instability of institutions and policies, as well as of authorities and pub-
lic agents. This discourages the development of linkages and networks 
and erodes mutual confidence and consensus, because all agents assume 
that once policymakers leave their posts, the policy framework will return 
to where it began. Moreover, these relationships often depend on per-
sonal contact, and there are no formal or institutional channels to develop 
them properly. Public agencies tend to act in an isolated fashion and are 
often reluctant to engage with the private sector, especially because 
of the risk of being captured by private interests. Finally, private sector 
organizations often lack the technical and professional staff to promote 
and implement any kind of PPC, and business associations are often more 
prepared to lobby the government than to cooperate in order to design, 
implement, and monitor productive development policies.
In recent years, however, several cooperative initiatives have emerged. 
In addition to the cases analyzed in this research, some sort of PPC is 
included in the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) policies of the City 
of Buenos Aires, the clusters program sponsored by the Undersecretary 
of Industry, some initiatives of the National Agency for Science and 
Technology Promotion (Agencia National de Promoción Cientifica y 
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Tecnológica – ANPCyT), the wine industry in Mendoza, and the rice sector 
in Concepción (Sánchez, Rozemberg, and Butler, 2011), among others.1 The 
Competitiveness Forums launched in 2003 by the Secretary of Industry are 
another example of a PPC. Nine chains were selected, and all of the agents 
involved (from the public and private sectors and academia) were called 
on to debate the main competitiveness problems affecting each chain and 
develop strategic plans to address them. These were meant to be forums 
for the exchange of information and a tool for coordinating actions among 
all the different actors related to a production chain. However, the software 
and information services sector was the only case in which a strategic plan 
was effectively designed and concrete actions proposed (Gutman, López, 
and Ubfal, 2006).
Devlin and Moguillansky (2009) and Schneider (2010) provide anal-
yses of PPC cases, highlighting the successes and failures and distilling 
lessons aimed at improving the efficacy of these arrangements. From the 
discussion and evidence gathered in those papers, the following factors 
emerge as conditions favoring the success of PPC:
• Strong support of government leaders
• Stability over time
• Limited number of participants in the deliberation and governing bodies
• Representation of all the relevant parties involved
• Existence of a professional and meritocratic civil service
• Competent technical staff
• Effective representation of business
• Adequate frequency and duration of interactions
• Appropriate monitoring routines.
Notwithstanding these lessons, it is not easy to develop metrics that 
can measure the impact of the PPC. As stated by Schneider (2010), a pos-
sible metric would be whether the council promotes the desired policy 
outcome in greater quantity and quality than would be expected without 
1  Devlin and Moguillansky (2009) discuss the cases of Fundación ExportAr and 
Prosperar, the dissolved National Investment Agency, two initiatives that involve PPC 
mechanisms.
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public-private cooperation. However, it is difficult to establish the appro-
priate counterfactual for the baseline, and it is also difficult to separate 
the impact of the PPC from that of the policy itself. Another possible met-
ric is the contribution of business-government cooperation to the quality 
of policies and policymaking. This is also somewhat problematic, as it is 
difficult to measure the quality of policymaking through objective indica-
tors. Given these drawbacks, it is not surprising that there are few evalu-
ations of the impact of PPC.
In spite of the difficulty of establishing adequate metrics, a cost-bene-
fit approach may be useful to understand the impact of PPC. Participating 
in these arrangements implies costs in the form of time spent in meetings. 
The government may incur costs associated with ceding part of its deci-
sion-making authority, and the private sector may divulge information 
that it would prefer to keep secret. Only if the benefits associated with 
participation in PPC (e.g., solving specific problems faced by the various 
stakeholders) outweigh these costs will there be incentives for agents to 
participate in them. However, benefits could accrue through rent-seeking, 
which points to the need to establish institutional arrangements that min-
imize the scope for such behavior.
This chapter aims to contribute to the debate on the role of PPC in 
productive development policies through a detailed analysis of four case 
studies in Argentina.2 The case studies include a brief account of the sec-
tor or activity to which the productive development policy is applied, a 
description of the policy, and a characterization of the PPC mechanisms 
involved. The case studies also present analysis aimed at generating 
knowledge about a number of issues, including the following:
• What are the conditions that may favor or deter the emergence of 
PPC mechanisms?
• What incentives and monitoring mechanisms are present in the pro-
ductive development policies studied?
2 There are a few available studies on the subject in Argentina. Bisang, Anlló, and 
Campi (2009) analyze private-public networks in the agriculture sector. Lengyel and 
Bottino (2010) study the emergence of partnerships in the agricultural machinery and 
biotechnology industries. McDermott and Corredoira (2010) discuss the case of the 
wine industry in Mendoza.
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• What is the degree of involvement and authority of the public and 
private sectors?
• What are the characteristics of the public agencies involved (e.g., 
flexibility, bureaucratic quality, isolated high-level areas, stability of 
key public servants, etc.)?
• What are the characteristics of the private partners (e.g., legitimacy, 
existence of prior consensus on relevant policy issues, technical capa-
bilities, etc.)?
• Has the PPC contributed to the improvement of the quality and out-
comes of productive development policies? If so, how? If not, why not?
• Has the PPC generated other positive effects beyond those originally 
envisaged? Has it, for example, become a platform for identifying 
new challenges and opportunities?
• What is the cost-benefit balance of participating in PPC as perceived 
by public and private sector participants?
• Did rent-seeking and free-riding behaviors emerge? If not, what 
mechanisms were employed to prevent them?
• How is PPC expected to evolve in the near future?
The methodology employed includes analysis of data from second-
ary sources (official statistics, surveys, websites, publications, etc.) and 
interviews with the key agents involved in each case. The aim was to col-
lect information to address the following questions:
• What were the problems faced before PPC was launched?
• What factors led to the establishment of PPC?
• Was PPC directly associated with the productive development policy, 
or did it emerge during the policy’s implementation?
• What were the institutional arrangements chosen, and why? What 
types of issues are discussed in the context of PPC?
• How did the public sector reorganize in order to adapt to PPC?
• Does PPC help the government gain access to valuable information 
from the private sector?
• Has PPC led to the emergence of permanent public-private networks 
that may transcend the original objective of the collaborative effort?
• What actions were taken, if any, to improve the resilience of PPC?
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The evidence gathered from the case studies will bring out common 
features that may lead to the success (or failure) of PPC, as well as idio-
syncratic features related to the objectives, actors, or specific arrange-
ments adopted in each case. The result of this analysis is presented in the 
final section, along with lessons learned that may be applied to other sec-
tors and regions in order to increase the effectiveness of PPC schemes
Empleartec: Human Capital for the Software and Information 
Services Sector
The Problem
Argentina has become a significant player in the software and informa-
tion services (SIS) sector within the region. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Argentina was the major Latin American exporter of 
SIS in 2010. After the 2001–2002 crisis, the SIS sector gained momentum, 
helped initially by the devaluation of the peso, which fostered exports, 
and then by the economic recovery, which led to rapid growth in the 
domestic market. Annual revenues grew from US$830 million to US$3 
billion between 2003 and 2011, while exports rose from US$170 million 
to US$790 million, and employment increased from 19,000 to 64,000, 
according to data from the Software & IT Services Chamber of Commerce 
(Cámara de Empresas de Software y Servicios Informáticos – CESSI). 
According to the Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security 
(MTEySS), between 1998 and 2011, the SIS sector had the highest employ-
ment growth rate in Argentina’s economy.
The sector’s vibrant performance was reinforced by some specific 
productive development policies. In 2003, the Ministry of Economy cre-
ated the SIS Competitiveness Forum with the aim of initiating a debate 
on the policies needed to improve competitiveness in the sector. The 
forum led to the 2004–2014 Strategic Plan for Software and Information 
Services, which identified challenges and opportunities and defined con-
crete actions to be carried out. Officials from the national, provincial, and 
municipal governments, as well as representatives from the private sec-
tor and academia (Gutman, López, and Ubfal, 2006), participated in the 
forum. Subsequently, in 2004, two laws promoting the SIS sector were 
passed. Law No. 25.856 established software production as an industrial 
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activity subject to possible tax exemptions, favorable credit terms, and 
other concessions. Law No. 25.922 granted tax benefits to SIS companies 
and created a Software Industry Promotion Fund (Fondo Fiduciario de 
Promoción de la Industria del Software – FONSOFT) aimed at financing 
R&D expenditure in SMEs, universities, and research centers. Furthermore, 
many Argentine provinces are offering their own tax benefits to SIS com-
panies wishing to invest in their territories (e.g., the city of Buenos Aires, 
Córdoba, Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Tucumán).
All studies dealing with export competitiveness and investment 
attraction in the SIS industry highlight the fact that access to skilled 
human resources is a key factor in this sector (Doh, Bunyaratavej, and 
Hahn, 2008; Meyer, 2007; Nyahoho, 2010) not only from the point of view 
of knowledge, but has also because it has a major impact on costs.3
Although Argentina’s educational system has been, to date, a source 
of competitive advantage in the SIS sector, increasing labor demand 
derived from the rapid growth of the sector has led to fierce competi-
tion for scarce human resources. In fact, there is broad consensus that 
the most significant obstacle to further growth in the SIS sector is labor 
supply restrictions, which result in skilled labor shortages and wage pres-
sures (OPSSI, 2010).
OPSSI (2010) estimates that in the past 13 years, the number of new 
students enrolled in graduate and postgraduate programs in information 
technology (IT) has been stable at an average of 22,500 entrants. Since 
only some 15 percent of new entrants graduate, there are only about 
3,000 new IT professionals annually. In turn, employment in this sector has 
increased at a rate of 6,000 jobs per year in recent years (Figure 4.1). This 
gap is even wider given the fact that approximately 50 percent of grad-
uates do not work in software and computer service firms, but rather in 
other sectors, the government, or other institutions, or are self-employed.
The lagging supply of IT workers is due mostly to the lack of inter-
est in the field on the part of young people. Although this is a problem in 
many Western countries, there could also be specific factors at stake in 
3 Direct and indirect labor costs amount to more than 70 percent of total costs in the 
SIS sector in Argentina (OPSSI, 2012).
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Argentina. López and Ramos (2008) point to flaws in secondary educa-
tion, such as poor performance in mathematics and science in Argentine 
schools, as measured by Program for International Students Assessments 
(PISA) test scores. This may deter students from entering into IT-related 
careers. Another factor, according to these authors, may be imperfect 
information about labor market conditions, which leads to a flawed per-
ception about the growing demand for IT professionals.
The Program
To try to solve the labor force bottleneck, the government and the private 
sector have been taking actions to provide training and study opportu-
nities in the IT sector (López, Ramos, and Torre, 2010). These policies are 
often launched and managed in public-private cooperation schemes that 
are to some extent a legacy of the intense interaction between the gov-
ernment and the private sector in the Competitiveness Forum, the devel-
opment of the Strategic Plan for the sector, and the enactment of laws to 
foster development of the industry.
The key private actor in this cooperation is CESSI, which was cre-
ated in 1990. Today, CESSI brings together more than 350 companies and 
Figure 4.1    Employment in the Software and Information Services Sector, 
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Sources: Observatory of Employment and Entrepreneurial Development/Ministry of Labor, 
Employment, and Social Security; and the Secretary of University Policy.
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institutions representing 80 percent of revenues and accounting for more 
than 85 percent of employment in the sector. Twenty-five regional and 
provincial organizations representing the software sector in their jurisdic-
tions are also affiliated with CESSI and another 400 firms are indirectly 
associated with it.
At the end of 2005, CESSI and the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology launched the InverTI en vos (“Invest in Yourself”) program to 
promote employment and educational opportunities in IT-related fields 
among high school students. Scholarships programs were also launched. 
The Becas Bicentenario program grants scholarships to students wish-
ing to enter into priority fields, including many IT-related ones. Another 
program is the National Program for Graduate Studies in ICT (Programa 
Nacional de Becas para Carreras de Grado en Área TICS – PNBTIC), which 
grants scholarships to students in IT-related fields of study.
Between 2004 and 2006, there were two relatively large train-
ing programs in operation: the +Mas Plan sponsored by Microsoft, co-
funded with the MTEySS, and jointly organized with CESSI; and the 
Entertech Plan sponsored by Oracle and Sun, with the participation of 
MTEySS and CESSI. More than 3,500 people were trained in these pro-
grams. A second version of the Entertech Plan launched in 2008 trained 
1,500 people. In 2007 the InverTI en Vos program trained 800 people. 
Oracle, CESSI, and the MTEySS managed the program. Some provinces 
also took action to promote IT-related studies. There are no evaluations 
of the impact of these programs. Although some of them may have 
helped alleviate the scarcity of qualified human resources, the above 
analysis suggests that they failed to significantly improve the labor sup-
ply shortage for this industry.
Case Presentation
The most ambitious training initiative adopted in the IT sector in 
Argentina’s history is the scholarship plan initially known as Control F/A, 
and currently called Empleartec. This initiative is managed by the MTEySS 
through its program called Continuous Training (Formación Continua) in 
conjunction with CESSI and some leading private firms (Cisco, Microsoft, 
Oracle, IBM, Red Hat, and local firms such as Calipso, Globant, Snoop, and 
G&L Group).
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The MTEySS, with the support of the World Bank and the United 
Nations Development Programme, launched Formación Continua in 2007. 
The MTEySS cofinances the program. Control F/A is one of the four larg-
est programs of the 40 such initiatives currently managed by the MTEySS. 
These programs are mainly aimed at young people who have difficulty 
finding employment or who are unemployed, but they are open to anyone 
over 18. In fact, as unemployment rates have been falling, the content of 
the Formación Continua program has gradually changed, and now focuses 
more on upgrading job skills rather than entry into the labor market.
The launch of the Control F/A program was a natural follow-on to 
the previous collaborative experiences between CESSI, the MTEySS, and 
some private SIS firms. The first stage of the program included CESSI and 
five large SIS firms (Microsoft, Oracle, Sun, Cisco and IBM.)4 Other firms, 
universities, and software poles and clusters were subsequently incorpo-
rated. Today, in addition to the abovementioned local and foreign firms, 
16 poles and clusters and 14 universities and other educational organiza-
tions are involved in the program.
When the Control F/A program began, its purpose was to train human 
resources in some specific areas defined by the five original sponsoring 
firms. The training was mostly on the proprietary technologies of those 
firms and made use of teaching materials already available through the 
Control + F scholarships.5 Later, at the request of the MTEySS, the scope 
of the courses was expanded to include more technologies, including free 
and open-source programs and applications, and the Control+A schol-
arships were created to provide basic training in IT, specifically digital 
alphabetization.
Currently, free training courses covering 40 different technologi-
cal areas and levels are offered in the city of Buenos Aires, the Greater 
4 According to those interviewed for this research, this is the first case in which these 
giant IT firms worked together in a training program (although they work individually 
on similar training plans with governments in other countries).
5 The courses offered under this modality provide technical and functional training in 
areas such as computer programming, databases and operating systems administra-
tion, software development for mobile applications, video games, web page design, 
software project management, implementation of enterprise resource planning, soft-
ware testing, and others.
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Buenos Aires area, and another 21 cities in 14 provinces. The courses are 
funded by the MTEySS. Most are 80 hours long, and official certificates 
are delivered to students who pass them. Until 2013, the MTEySS had pro-
vided approximately US$7 million to run the program. Since its launch-
ing in mid-2012, the program has trained some 21,000 people. As part of 
the program, 43 institutions received 12 sets of state-of-the-art hardware 
equipment to install or improve computer labs where training courses 
are offered. A more recently launched stage of the program (which was 
renamed Empleartec in 2012) aimed to train 30,000 people between 
2012 and 2014. Besides including new thematic areas and placing more 
emphasis on digital alphabetization,6 this new phase trained teachers 
and professors in the use of IT and promoted the use of IT technology in 
the fields and courses that grant teaching degrees in Argentina. It also 
established linkages with other IT-related public programs and will grad-
ually align the contents of the courses with the human capital require-
ments identified in other private-public partnerships in this sector (e.g., 
the Ministry of Industry’s 2020 Strategic Industrial Plan).
The Empleartec Program has five phases. The first includes basic 
planning based on analysis of the demand for skills and the available sup-
ply of courses and knowledge in different areas. CESSI invites its mem-
bers and other partners to take part in the program, and a more detailed 
supply-demand analysis is made to determine the courses, the loca-
tions where they can be given, and the institutions able to teach them. 
A plan is then presented to the MTEySS. Once the proposal is approved, 
a framework protocol is signed between the MTEySS and CESSI and 
specific agreements are signed with firms and educational institutions. 
Advertising campaigns are then launched and beneficiaries are selected. 
CESSI selects the beneficiaries and then checks them with the univer-
sities, clusters, poles, and other educational organizations (referred to as 
implementers or efectores in the program’s terminology), as well as with 
the sponsoring firms, based on the parameters previously defined with 
the MTEySS. Students who complete the courses receive an official certi-
fication issued by the MTEySS and are entered into a database accessible 
6 Ultimately, digital alphabetization contributes to expanding the market for IT firms.
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online to businesses needing to hire personnel trained in the areas cov-
ered by the program. The ministry’s Network of Employment Offices also 
helps graduates find jobs and proposes prospective students for jobs. 
Students evaluate the quality of the courses and educational institutions 
and provide feedback to CESSI.
The MTEySS and CESSI jointly define goals every six months, and 
disbursement of funds is subject to accomplishment of those goals. The 
MTEySS verifies the actual delivery of the educational services and moni-
tors the evolution of the program through a follow-up system in which its 
regional employment offices also take part.
The division of labor within the program is as follows:
• CESSI designs the program and presents it to the MTEySS; coordi-
nates the design and implementation of courses jointly with the firms, 
institutions, and universities participating in the program; administers 
funds received from MTEySS; and monitors program performance 
and outcomes.
• Sponsoring firms identify the areas where knowledge and demand-
supply gaps exist; determine the institutions that will give the training 
courses and when and where they are to be given; and ensures the 
quality of the courses and the teaching (in most cases, defining the 
course content and providing the teaching materials, while in others 
this is responsibility of the educational organizations).
• Educational organizations and clusters teach the training courses and 
provide the infrastructure and logistics. Instructors are paid by the 
hour, and the program pays the implementers for the use of their 
facilities.
As the most representative SIS sector business association, CESSI 
operates as coordinator of the program on behalf of the private sector and 
serves as the interface with the MTEySS. Beyond financing the program, 
the ministry’s role is mainly oversight. That is, it ensures that program 
design and aims are aligned with its own policy objectives, supervises 
program implementation, helps disseminate employment opportuni-
ties among those trained, and incorporates trainees in databases where 
employers can look for prospective employees.
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Although the original target audience of the Formación Continua pro-
gram was young people who could not find employment, in practice, it 
was clear from the start that the Control + F Scholarships were aimed at 
students who had at least completed high school, including those who 
already had work experience in the sector or who were employed in the 
IT field. According to some of those interviewed for this study, the quality 
of the courses in general seems to have been improving. Basic IT courses 
are also given, as well as courses that allow students to enter the labor 
market relatively rapidly by mastering certain technologies.
There was a learning process during implementation of the plan. The 
composition, background, and interests of the students were not known 
a priori, so the firms and implementers had to adjust the nature and con-
tent of the courses to meet the needs of the target audience. According 
to some of those interviewed, this process helped improve the courses 
and better define their audience. 
An adaptation and learning process also occurred within the organi-
zations involved in the program. The MTEySS had to adapt to work with 
a sector that employs people with higher educational levels on average 
than those of its other sectoral partners. Thus, at the beginning of the 
program, there was some reluctance in certain areas of the ministry to 
get involved, especially in the regional offices. CESSI, the SIS firms, and 
the universities also underwent an adaptation process aimed at includ-
ing in their training plans people with employment problems and/or with 
poor educational backgrounds.
Other lessons emerged during the evolution of the program that are 
now reflected in new commitments and aims included in the program’s 
new phase. The MTEySS wants firms to adapt their manuals to make them 
more effective and pedagogical,7 and also wants to improve its moni-
toring of teachers’ skills. It has even incorporated a curriculum expert in 
the program. The MTEySS has also asked CESSI to make a technological 
adaptation of a software program that helps blind people use comput-
ers and has installed a new lab aimed at running 3D simulation programs 
7 The international firms use the same manuals employed in other parts of the world 
where they organize similar courses.
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that will be used in the training programs of other sectors. Officials from 
MTEySS indicated that around 65 percent of the students trained under 
the Control +F program found employment or increased their wages after 
completing the courses. Although the program trained people not work-
ing in the SIS sector or who were unemployed and improved the capacity 
of people already acquainted with IT technologies, there is no single mea-
sure of the success of the program. In any case, when one compares the 
number of people trained (and the number projected in the new phase) 
with the total number of people employed in the sector, the program has 
the potential to have a major impact on the SIS labor market. The renewal 
and expansion of the program is a sign that both the private and public 
sectors have a favorable view of its outcomes.
Case Analysis
Trust and Previous Relationships
The existence of prior linkages among all of the agents involved facil-
itated the creation and implementation of this program. Moreover, the 
need for trained personnel had been extensively discussed in many are-
nas, including the Sectoral Competitiveness Forum, and was identified 
as the main obstacle for progress in the SIS sector in Argentina. All of 
the agents that participated in launching the program had already been 
involved in training plans that were their direct precursors. This gener-
ated a valuable learning process about the supply and demand side of the 
training market in this sector.
Profile of Private Sector Representatives
CESSI is a relatively young business association, and the profile of its mem-
bers and directors is different from that of the average Argentine business 
association insofar as they are mostly academics who work in a sector in 
which technical change is rapid and the need to be aware of global busi-
ness trends is more pressing than for the average Argentine firm. This 
could help explain why CESSI has been so active in launching initiatives to 
address the challenges faced by the sector (i.e., lack of skilled personnel, 
improving access to finance and foreign markets, incrementing R&D activ-
ities, etc.). Today, CESSI is widely acknowledged as representing the inter-
ests of the SIS sector, a status it earned through its actions and initiatives. 
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The MTEySS officials interviewed for this study stated that CESSI was the 
most dynamic business association among all those with which they had 
worked on sectoral training programs.8
Incentive Scheme
The main incentive for the private sector is the prospect of training human 
resources, a need felt by firms of all sizes and segments within the SIS 
industry. Costs are low and are mainly borne by CESSI, which assigns 
staff to manage the program, and by private firms, which also assign staff 
and provide course content at little or no cost. Firms participating in the 
program have no monetary incentive to do so, although in some cases the 
courses teach technologies developed and sold by them (hence contrib-
uting to expanding their markets). Universities and clusters receive fund-
ing for their teachers and state-of-the-art equipment, which allows them 
to consolidate institutionally.
Governance, Management, and Operation
The private sector has broad involvement and ample authority both at the 
design and implementation stages. CESSI, jointly with sponsoring firms, 
defines course objectives and content and invites universities and clus-
ters to participate. The rationale behind the division of labor is that the 
private sector knows what skills are needed (which often change rapidly 
as a result of technical progress), and the institutions design high-qual-
ity courses and provide materials and content based on their technical 
knowledge. The government has access to information that otherwise 
would be very costly to gather. The MTEySS has access to funds that are 
not available to the private sector, can set up proper monitoring mech-
anisms, and has a wide network of agencies that can help disseminate 
the program and foster the insertion of trained personnel into the formal 
labor market. Universities and other implementing agencies have con-
tacts with potential students and with the instructors.
8 According to MTEySS officials, in the industrial sectors, trade unions (which do not 
exist in the SIS sector) are often more interested than employers’ associations in pro-
moting training activities.
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Capture, Rent-Seeking, and Free-Riding
Although the program includes courses that train people in proprietary 
technologies created and/or owned by sponsoring firms, the fact that the 
program is open to participation by all private firms reduces the risk that 
it will be captured by a small group of firms that could use it to reinforce 
the use of their proprietary technologies at the expense of other firms. 
Even some open-source technologies, such as Linux, are part of the pro-
gram. Likewise, although it would appear that large firms would benefit 
most from this program, since they are the largest labor demanders, the 
alleviation of the labor supply bottleneck favors all kinds of firms because 
it reduces wage pressures and staff turnover. Moreover, some sponsor-
ing firms, such as Oracle, Microsoft, and Red Hat, are seldom interested 
in recruiting people trained under this program for their Argentine affili-
ates. Their major incentive is to train human resources who can use their 
technologies. That is, they are more interested in expanding their market 
share than expanding their work force in Argentina. In summary, although 
the SIS sector is largely heterogeneous in terms of firm size, specializa-
tion, strategies, and objectives, the concern about the lack of trained 
human resources is broadly shared, which lends legitimacy to this type of 
program. Thus, rent-seeking and free-riding do not appear to be associ-
ated with this program.
Resilience
This PPC experience has been ongoing for many years and was ongoing 
in 2014. This is a testament to the resilience of the program, even in the 
presence of big changes in Argentina’s labor market. This resilience has 
been strengthened by the legitimacy and capabilities of the private actors 
involved, as well as by the continuity of senior management in the MTEySS 
and the creation of a specialized section within the ministry managed by 
a professional structure that deals exclusively with this kind of program.
Learning
A learning process has taken place during the evolution of the program 
that has to do not only with adaptation by the public and private sectors, 
but also with the emergence of new elements included in the new phase 
of the plan. These new elements aim to improve the alignment of the 
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program’s activities with the training needs of the local markets, as well as 
generate externalities that could benefit other sectors or disadvantaged 
groups among the population.
Fashion Design
In the fashion industry, the international competitiveness of differentiated 
products largely hinges on their design features, as these features enable 
the incorporation of value added and contribute to attaining better posi-
tioning in high-end segments of the international market. Thus, product 
design plays a crucial role in the fashion industry. Over the past decade, 
some firms in Argentina’s garment industry have gradually introduced 
design management as a systematic activity at firms, driving remarkable 
transformations in their business practices. At the same time, apparel 
consumers in Argentina have started to recognize original design. These 
recent shifts buttress a potential for export growth that was not present 
a decade ago.
This case study describes the PPC between the National Industrial 
Technology Institute’s Textile Research and Development Center (INTI 
Textiles) and the Pro-Tejer Foundation to promote fashion design. This 
collaboration includes a study entitled the “Argentine Design Map,” a pro-
gram called Street Design Circuits, and the Signature Fashion National 
Design Survey.
Argentina’s Fashion Design Phenomenon
The Argentine fashion design phenomenon started in the 1990s and 
consolidated in the 2000s. At present, undergraduate design pro-
grams—graphic, fashion, and textile design—rank among the top 10 pub-
lic university programs, with the largest enrollment in the area around 
Buenos Aires (MECyT, 2005). In the 2000s, design increasingly became 
a key competitive factor in the apparel industry. Business startups 
launched by some 20 fashion designers with a university degree and the 
efforts made by large garment marketers (brands) raised design aware-
ness among Argentine consumers.
Argentine designers entered the country’s traditional clothing mar-
ket with their own brands in 2001 (Saulquin, 2006). These designers offer 
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high-value-added products on a small scale and are known as “signa-
ture fashion designers.” Initially, their products were sold at multi-brand 
stores located in Buenos Aires’ commercial hubs, such as the trendy 
Palermo neighborhood. Some have grown sufficiently large to have their 
own stores in leading shopping malls. According to the Signature Fashion 
National Design Survey (Marino, Mon, and Marré, 2011), 200 firms manu-
facture signature design garments in Argentina. Ninety percent of them 
have annual sales below US$400,000, while 30 percent export their 
clothes, primarily to Latin America, Italy, and Spain. For 5 percent of 
them, exports account for 80 percent of their output.
A large number of Argentine fashion brands have established them-
selves in the local market. Increasingly, brands view design as a key 
strategic component of their business and change their organizational, 
marketing, and production practices to incorporate design manage-
ment as a systematic activity. Brands have professionalized their design 
capabilities. Some have added designers to their payroll to help them 
develop their brand image. Others have also introduced original design in 
the styles they offer. Some brands have allied themselves with signature 
designers to create original designs for specific product lines. A feature 
that sets Argentina’s fashion market apart is the number of local brands. 
While in other Latin American countries familiar consumer brands are 
largely international, in Argentina most renowned brands are domestic 
(Saulquin, 2008).
Consumers’ greater appreciation for original design and the grow-
ing design professionalization of local brands have propelled the inter-
national dissemination of Argentina’s fashion industry. National brands 
have successfully expanded across Latin America, opening stores and 
building regional franchises. In turn, signature designers have ventured 
into the U.S. and Japanese markets, selling their garments at specialty 
design stores. More Argentine brands and signature designers now par-
ticipate in international fashion shows. These transformations have led 
to a new three-category segmentation of the market—mass market, 
brands, and signature designers—depending on the degree of original-
ity and sophistication of the product designs. While common in devel-
oped countries, this categorization is rare in Latin America, where apparel 
markets are only divided into two segments: mass market and brands. 
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Firms competing in Argentina’s mass market segment typically copy or 
adapt styles designed and marketed in developed countries, leverag-
ing their Southern Hemisphere location to follow trend-setting countries 
counter-seasonally.
Argentina’s garment exports have recorded steady growth since 
2000. Totaling US$87 million in 2010, these exports were primarily 
shipped to South America. The volume of garment imports is consider-
ably larger, reaching US$328 million in 2010. China, Peru, and Brazil are 
the leading sources of imports. In 2005, Argentina’s government estab-
lished a nonautomatic import license scheme to protect the domestic 
industry. This protectionist policy became substantially more stringent in 
the second half of 2011.
Case Description
Pro-Tejer
Pro-Tejer is a nongovernmental organization created to provide a polit-
ical forum for the defense of Argentina’s textile and apparel industry. It 
stands out among traditional business associations because it promotes 
a comprehensive view of the textile value chain.9 It was founded in 2003 
by a 38-member board. Aldo Karagozian, the owner of TN&Platex10 and 
Pro-Tejer’s chairman since its inception to 2007, organized the founders. 
They came from companies all along the textile value chain and from a 
variety of organizations—including universities, a research institute (INTI 
Textiles), and a labor union—related to the sector. Pro-Tejer’s founding 
board intended to build an advocacy platform to represent and promote 
the interests of the local textile and fashion industry after its value chain 
became fragmented in the 1990s. Pro-Tejer soon became the industry’s 
leading representative, championing policies that enhance the sector’s 
competitiveness and, in particular, lobbying for trade protection. While 
the organization encompasses the entire industry, not all subsectors are 
equally represented or view it as representing their interests. In particular, 
thread mills weigh more heavily and wield considerably more power than 
9 The textile value chain encompasses fiber producers, thread mills, fabric manufac-
turers, garment manufacturers, designers, brands, and supply vendors.
10 TN&Platex is Argentina’s largest cotton fabric producer and exporter.
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designers and brands. Pro-Tejer is managed by an executive director, who 
currently relies on two outside advisors and a staff with professionals in 
economics, business administration, and communications.
Promoting design in the textile and apparel industry was one of 
Karagozian’s main goals. Pro-Tejer’s initial leadership viewed design as 
an essential driver for the industry’s development and international com-
petitiveness, and thus sought to build initiatives with public sector agen-
cies, private firms, and universities. The organization’s key move to foster 
design was its collaboration with INTI Textiles. In Pro-Tejer’s early years, a 
few founders who primarily represented thread mills and fabric manufac-
turers established the organization’s policies. This did not hinder efforts 
to promote fashion design at first, but later it curtailed the continuity of 
these efforts, as these initiatives did not bring any financial gains to these 
two subsectors.
INTI Textiles
INTI is the nation’s foremost industrial technology public research insti-
tute. It was created in 1957 as an independent institute to conduct indus-
trial technology-applied research and outreach programs to enhance 
Argentina’s industrial competitiveness. One of INTI’s centers, INTI Textiles, 
promotes textile and apparel industry development, serving also as a 
technological benchmark for the industry. Since its inception in 1967, INTI 
Textiles has provided a number of services, including lab tests and training 
for textile and apparel manufacturing technologies, that effectively trans-
fer knowledge and technology to firms, building trust-based relationships 
among individuals serving at both ends. Approximately 70 percent of INTI 
Textiles’ funding comes from its own services, while the remaining 30 per-
cent comes from INTI’s budget. Labor relations at INTI are characterized 
by long-standing job stability. In fact, INTI Textiles’ director and deputy 
director have served in those positions for over 20 years.
In 1997, INTI Textiles formulated a long-term strategy based on the 
promotion of fashion design, despite some resistance from within INTI 
itself. In pursuit of this strategy, INTI Textiles gradually introduced spe-
cific services for garment manufacturers, designers, and brands, refocus-
ing its traditional operations. In 2001, it created a Trends Observatory 
that reports on international fashion and trends, researches Argentina’s 
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fashion design identity, disseminates Argentine signature designers’ work 
in the domestic market, and trains apparel manufacturers, designers, and 
brands. Since 2007, the Trends Observatory has also conducted research 
on Argentina’s fashion design identity. To this end, it surveys emerging 
trends in Argentina and crafts the Argentine Design Map. This map iden-
tifies fashion “signature” designs across the nation, their designers, and 
the productive processes used to manufacture garments. INTI Textiles 
has become remarkably well known as an expert in fashion design among 
industry players.
INTI’s organizational structure provides a great deal of autonomy to 
its various research and development centers. INTI Textiles is a mixed 
organization, with private firms joining by paying a monthly fee. By 2011, it 
had 182 associates. Industry representatives, who are part of an executive 
committee of 12 members, share decisions on the center’s planning and 
follow-up activities. They represent three industry chambers, one busi-
ness association, and eight large and medium-sized companies. Private 
sector engagement favors information exchanges that shed light on the 
sector’s needs.
Public-Private Collaboration
Since 2005 INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer have come together on a num-
ber of collaborative initiatives to develop Argentina’s textile and apparel 
industry. This study focuses on those initiatives specifically oriented to 
promote design: the Street Design Circuits program, conducted from 
2007 to 2011, and the Signature Fashion National Design Survey, car-
ried out since 2010. A related initiative is the aforementioned Argentine 
Design Map, begun in 2007 and still under way.
The most important collaborative endeavor between INTI Textiles and 
Pro-Tejer was the Street Design Circuits program, intended to advance 
their common goal of positioning Argentina as a fashion design hub. The 
organizations’ shared vision came in the wake of the Argentine Design 
Map, which identified signature designs featuring originality, innovation, 
and a unique identity, and the creators of those designs. The Street Design 
Circuits program was created to disseminate this phenomenon and edu-
cate the general public on fashion design, raising awareness about the 
value it adds to national products. To these ends, the program organized 
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one-day tours around urban design circuits. Circuit layouts were mapped 
to showcase the fashion design offerings found in stores located in spe-
cific areas.11 After the program’s inception in 2007, 22 such events were 
carried out, with 95 percent of them organized in 2007–2010 and the last 
one taking place in 2011.
The idea for the program surfaced in a day-long brainstorming ses-
sion held by members of both institutions to come up with plans for joint 
efforts to support and boost the visibility of Argentina’s fledgling local 
identity fashion design. The program’s scheme and name were crafted at 
that meeting.
Each institution took up specific roles and brought distinct resources 
to the PPC. INTI Textiles contributed its knowledge of local designers. 
Pro-Tejer provided funding to support specific activities, such as staffing 
events, providing the logistics needed to approach designers to invite them 
to join the program, and contacting local media to advertise the program.
From their inception the tours were funded with contributions from 
several sources. The ongoing program required funds ranging from 
US$10,000 to US$20,000. Pro-Tejer provided a large share of the funding. 
The resources required to organize the program in every city came from 
partnerships with local institutions. The funding scheme initially designed 
by both INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer depended on contributions from compa-
nies and other organizations that would serve as sponsors, but this scheme 
failed to prove fruitful. Only TN&Platex, managed by Karagozian, provided 
financial support for all program editions, and only seven other textile com-
panies occasionally supported the program financially. As a result, the pro-
gram founders resorted to agreements with local institutions in the cities 
where the program was carried out to help them cover event expenses. 
Pro-Tejer ceased to fund the program in late 2010. The program’s first edi-
tion took place in Palermo, a Buenos Aires neighborhood boasting a large 
designer density, with the city’s Ministry of Culture as a strategic partner. 
This government agency provided financial support for all the events con-
ducted in the city. The only program event conducted in 2011 took place in 
Salta with the support of that province’s local government.
11 INTI Textiles currently records 20 design circuits in Argentina.
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Overall, the goals of the program were accomplished. These goals 
included disseminating signature designers’ work, legitimizing the value 
of original design work in the eyes of the consumer, and raising awareness 
about the magnitude of this sector in Argentina. Notably, the program 
managed to successfully and broadly disseminate Argentine fashion 
design in the local market, fostering a consumer culture that appreciates 
Argentina’s original design, building networks that bring signature fash-
ion designers together, putting the design phenomenon on the public 
agenda, and promoting Argentine fashion design internationally.
While it is impossible to quantify the extent to which the program 
influenced the development of a consumer culture that values design, 
there is evidence to suggest that its impact was substantial. First, several 
signature designers have come together on a number of joint initiatives. 
Second, signature designers and brands have started forging alliances 
to develop specific product lines. These partnerships enable brands to 
reposition their corporate images, explicitly associating themselves with 
design and originality in consumers’ minds. In turn, these alliances help 
signature designers disseminate their work to broader audiences, bene-
fiting from press coverage that is usually unavailable to them. Third, some 
signature designers with long track records have begun to serve as advi-
sors on collection development and brand image for domestic brands. 
Fourth, signature designers have grown closer to thread mills, which have 
started to cater to their smaller-scale needs.
Networks of signature designers have been created as a result of this 
program. As designers from several cities were able to showcase their 
work, they came together to organize business and productive ventures. 
While the creation of these networks was not a specific program goal, 
INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer supported designers’ spontaneous initiatives 
and designed projects to enhance them. One of the most important of 
these events in terms of duration, organization, and resource require-
ments is Las cosas del quehacer. In 2010, the Trends Observatory started 
this project to provide a forum for signature design in Argentina, inviting 
signature designers from the provinces to discuss the country’s fashion 
design. Starting in 2011, the Street Design Circuits program lost momen-
tum within the INTI Textiles-Pro-Tejer PPC, while Las cosas del quehacer 
has grown into a new PPC, albeit without Pro-Tejer’s financial support.
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Inserting Argentina’s design phenomenon into the public agenda has led 
to the creation of programs intended to incorporate design into manufac-
turing companies’ operations at the national, provincial, and municipal lev-
els. In addition, public agencies have increased their interaction. An initiative 
that engages a number of public and private organizations is the Argentine 
Design Map runway during Buenos Aires Fashion Week. In 2012, two such 
events were held, featuring eight signature designers from Argentine prov-
inces. INTI Textiles served as runway show curator, organizing participating 
firms’ presentations with the support of many other agencies.
As a result of the successful management and execution of the 
Argentine Design Map and Street Design Circuits program, INTI Textiles 
and Pro-Tejer chose to move forward on their collaboration, embarking 
on the Signature Fashion National Design Survey. The purpose of this sur-
vey is to create a tool to quantify and characterize the emerging fash-
ion design phenomenon. The first survey was conducted in 2010 and 
was used as the basis for a study entitled “Signature Fashion Design in 
Argentina.” This study includes an assessment of signature fashion pro-
duction and an economic impact analysis. The survey was revised and 
conducted again in 2011. While in 2010 the sample included 150 design-
ers, a year later this number had increased to 200.
The idea for this initiative came from the interaction of an INTI 
Textiles member and a Pro-Tejer official who had worked on the Street 
Design Circuits program and had decided to enroll together in a grad-
uate program in international culture and communication management. 
For the final paper in one of their courses, they chose to work together on 
Argentina’s signature fashion design phenomenon, specifically address-
ing the lack of quantitative information on it.
Both INTI and Pro-Tejer support the Signature Fashion National 
Design Survey with additional contributions. INTI Textiles has provided 
its signature fashion designers’ database and a dedicated team of Trends 
Observatory members. Pro-Tejer supplies institutional support and helps 
with dissemination. The goal of this program—to produce metrics that 
characterize and quantify the activity of signature fashion designers—has 
been accomplished. The dissemination of survey findings and their vast 
recognition among relevant public agencies have been among the most 
outstanding outcomes achieved by this public-private collaboration. This 
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has favored the visibility and institutionalization of the fashion design 
industry in the public sector.
Case Analysis
Incentive Scheme
In addition to Aldo Karagozian’s idealistic interest in promoting design 
in Argentina’s textile and apparel industry, a key incentive for his proac-
tive involvement in this PPC—as both Pro-Tejer’s founder and first chair—
was the potential benefits it might bring to Pro-Tejer’s positioning in the 
eyes of the public. Promoting design through specific actions such as 
the Argentine Design Map, the Street Design Circuits program, and the 
Signature Fashion National Design Survey strengthened Pro-Tejer’s pub-
lic image. This endeavor differed from the traditional protectionist lob-
bying efforts with which business associations in the textile industry had 
been associated in the past, as it highlighted the benefits of integrating 
the textile chain. One factor that fueled Pro-Tejer’s initial commitment 
to promote design was the recognition awarded by foreign specialists 
to Argentine design during the foundation’s early institutional missions 
abroad. Eventually, Pro-Tejer’s lobbying for protectionist policies legiti-
mized more protective policies afforded by Argentina’s national govern-
ment to the manufacturing sector. As a result, Pro-Tejer lost interest in 
supporting the Street Design Circuits program and stopped funding the 
program. But it continued to collaborate with INTI Textiles in promoting 
design with initiatives such as the Argentine Design Map and the Signature 
Fashion National Design Survey, as well as sponsoring the Buenos Aires 
Fashion Week’s runway show.
In addition, Pro-Tejer’s officials might have envisioned that the devel-
opment of a strong and internationally recognized local fashion industry, 
and the ability to sell its products in foreign markets, would imply greater 
demand for their companies’ products. However, this potential may have 
ceased to encourage them when, eventually, signature fashion designers’ 
business ventures proved of limited volume.
INTI Textiles’ incentives to engage in this PPC revolved around the fact 
that this collaboration largely fit with its long-term strategy to promote 
fashion design in Argentina. This strategy was set in motion in 1997 by INTI 
Textiles’ leadership, despite the opposition of some of INTI’s top officials 
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and other R&D centers. The fact that INTI Textiles’ leaders made this stra-
tegic decision and stuck to it despite initial reluctance is likely explained 
by their job stability and professionalism, the partial autonomy of this pub-
lic institution from short-term political swings, and its trust-based relation-
ships with private sector officials who turn to it for technological advice.
The PPC with Pro-Tejer to promote fashion design provided an 
opportunity for INTI Textiles to rise as a nationwide authority in fashion 
design. The initiatives carried out with Pro-Tejer awarded INTI Textiles 
greater visibility and recognition within its parent company, INTI, as well 
as among other public agencies and Argentina’s designer community. It 
also strengthened INTI Textiles’ autonomy from its parent organization’s 
leadership. Its newfound recognition among public agencies and fashion 
designers enabled INTI Textiles to broaden its Trends Observatory ser-
vices and enhance its self-sustainability.
Relationships
Prior interpersonal relationships between INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer 
members proved instrumental for the PPC. The people who initiated the 
collaboration had already established a personal connection, forged as 
a result of the technical advice provided by INTI Textiles to TN&Platex 
over the years. Their personal relationships were based on mutual trust 
and respect. INTI Textiles officials had also built similar ties with other 
Pro-Tejer founders. An example that illustrates these ties is their relation-
ship with Susana Saulquin, an Argentine expert on fashion sociology who 
participated in the creation and early management of the University of 
Buenos Aires’ Textile and Fashion Design Program. Saulquin, also a found-
ing member at Pro-Tejer, provided advice at the time to INTI Textiles. 
Hence, a first hypothesis to explain the creation of a favorable forum 
for the surge of ideas may point to the existence of previous inter-per-
sonal, trust-based relationships among the members of these institutions. 
These bonds supported a fast decision-making process that facilitated 
the design and execution of shared initiatives. A mutual knowledge of 
how the people involved in the PPC worked enabled participants to con-
fidently assign specific roles to execute these initiatives.
By 2002, Saulquin had noticed an emerging Argentine fashion trend-
setting phenomenon (Saulquin, 2006). This view was shared by Karagozian 
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and Patricia Marino, the head of INTI Textiles, who from their respective 
positions promoted local design with a number of efforts intended to 
link manufacturers and designers to drive the creation of products with 
a unique identity. The participation of Karagozian, Marino, and Saulquin 
in the early commissions set up at Pro-Tejer to work on potential strate-
gies led to the identification of design as the key to enhancing the inter-
national competitiveness of Argentina’s apparel industry.
The initiatives launched as part of this PPC are characterized by sym-
metric engagement of both the private and public sectors in their vision, 
design, and execution. The leadership at INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer shared 
a common view about the relevance of Argentina’s design phenome-
non and the need to make it more visible, coming together to design a 
research study on Argentina’s design identity, the Street Design Circuits 
program, and the Signature Fashion National Design Survey. While both 
the research study and the survey were always co-managed after their 
creation, the Street Design Circuits was managed jointly only in its early 
years (2007–2010). INTI Textiles alone oversaw its last edition in 2011.
Monitoring Mechanisms
These PPC initiatives lack any formal monitoring mechanisms to evalu-
ate outcomes and impact. The backbone of trust and respect that sup-
ports the relationships between managers at the two institutions made 
this collaboration possible, despite the absence of formal monitoring 
mechanisms. Within each institution, however, standard monitoring pro-
cedures control the actions of employees. At Pro-Tejer, for example, after 
each Street Design Circuits event, the staff involved in its co-manage-
ment reported to the board, accounting for all expenses.
Public and Private Sector Features
INTI Textiles’ ability to plan and execute this PPC appears to be largely 
attributed to its top officials’ stability and professionalism. The organi-
zation’s head and vice-head have made a professional career as sec-
tor specialists within the parent company, INTI, and have a strong sense 
of belonging to the institution. Thus, they enjoy the respect of the pro-
fessional staff in an organization with a culture that places a high value 
on technical expertise. In addition, INTI Textiles’ directors appear to be 
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endowed with uncommon leadership abilities as well as outstanding 
strategic vision and motivation. In fact, their success in accomplishing 
their unit’s strategic goals has recently been rewarded with appoint-
ments to higher managerial positions at INTI, heading the Marketing and 
Development Departments, respectively. 
Pro-Tejer’s management officials also displayed salient personal fea-
tures that might help explain their willingness to engage in this PPC and 
their ability to lead their organization in support of this collaboration. In 
particular, both Pro-Tejer’s chairman and its executive director at the time 
this PPC was built demonstrated conviction and motivation in fostering the 
professionalization of design in Argentina’s textile and apparel industry. The 
executive director also had a professional stature that is rare in Argentine 
business associations. He served as the Deputy Minister of Production 
for the Province of Buenos Aires’ and, more recently, as National Under-
Secretary of Foreign Trade. His assistant was recently appointed to man-
age the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Design Center’s Fashion Office. The 
question remains what drives the committed dedication of capable and 
motivated people in specific public areas and private organizations.
Funding
Funding was the primary hurdle for the continuity of some of these PPC 
initiatives. Early on in this collaboration, both organizations shared an 
interest in promoting design. However, the importance of this goal for 
each of them changed over time. INTI Textiles remained unwavering in its 
commitment to all three ventures—Argentine Design Map, Street Design 
Circuits, and the Signature Fashion National Design Survey—while Pro-
Tejer lost interest in the Street Design Circuits program, shifting its finan-
cial support to other initiatives of interest to its members. As a result, there 
were changes in the budget granted to the program that eventually led to 
its interruption. INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer did not receive any additional 
funding from INTI or any other public agency. Neither did they build a sta-
ble funding scheme that would have enabled the program to continue.
Learning
As a result of this PPC, Pro-Tejer and INTI Textiles learned how to design, 
execute, manage and assess programs shared and orchestrated with other 
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public and private organizations to tackle fashion design challenges. The 
Argentine Design Map and Street Design Circuits programs enabled INTI 
Textiles to identify specific areas for potential interventions to promote 
design and brands and educate consumers and designers. This experi-
ence also helped to professionalize the Trends Observatory team, train-
ing its members to curate, design, and manage projects. Finally, this PPC 
brought new opportunities and alternatives to gather information on pro-
duction issues and on local market consumer traits. As a result, the ability 
of INTI Textiles to analyze this industry is enriched, as it can complement 
the information it collects from its traditional sources.
Free-riding and Rent-seeking Behaviors
The Argentine Design Map, Street Design Circuits, and Signature Fashion 
National Design Survey initiatives do not feature any grants or mechanisms 
that may affect market prices. As a result, instances of rent-seeking are 
less likely to arise. In fact, no such instances have been found. However, a 
free-riding issue is present in the case of Pro-Tejer that is common in most 
business associations. While PPC costs are only footed by participants, its 
benefits trickle down to all industry players. In the case of the Street Design 
Circuits program, an additional free-riding problem emerges: designers 
and brands—supposedly the primary beneficiaries of this initiative—are not 
grouped in any organization that represents them, and most of them do 
not recognize Pro-Tejer as their advocate. Designers and brands drew ben-
efits from this program without taking part in its organization or contrib-
uting any funding. It comes as no surprise, then, that Pro-Tejer eventually 
decided to discontinue its financial support of the program.
Networking and Public-Private Collaboration Schemes:  
The Experience of Sugar Cane in Tucumán
Public-private collaboration in the sugar cane industry in Tucumán was 
focused on tackling a wide range of diseases and other problems that 
affected sugar cane yields. The poor performance in the primary stage 
had negative consequences on the entire network devoted to producing 
sugar, pulp, and paper and bio-fuels. The strategy chosen was to develop 
new disease-free varieties, reproduce them using modern techniques, 
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and disseminate them through commercial channels in order to enable 
farmers to replace the old crops and increase yields. To achieve these 
results, significant technological and economic requirements had to be 
met, which led to the need to establish PPC.
Sugar Cane Production
Currently, sugar cane production is based on tailor-made hybrid plants 
suitable for specific climate and soil conditions. Other factors such as 
bacteria and fungi, among others, affect crop yields. Many live inside the 
original plant and only disappear if the new seedling is free of such dis-
eases. As a result, local capacity to cope with these conditions is a key 
competitive factor.
Sugar crop production through conventional processes (using seed-
lings) allows an average of five harvests; hence, a plant replacement is 
needed every five or six years. To access the seedlings, farmers have two 
options: (1) develop their own hybrid varieties, and produce seed and 
seedlings; or (2) buy those products from a vivarium (specific companies 
devoted to producing or reproducing new hybrid seedlings). Producing 
seedlings by crossing varieties of sugar cane is a complex process. Its 
control and development require possessing a wide range of varieties 
and germplasms, equipment, and large storage areas, such as plant nurs-
eries. In addition, skilled personnel (geneticists, breeders, and experts in 
field work) are also needed. Modern biotechnology tools, such as molec-
ular markers, are used to shorten the innovation process. Additionally, 
genetically modified sugar cane varieties resistant to selected herbicides 
and/or tolerant of some insects are being developed.
The production of new seedlings is thus a high-technology activ-
ity subject to economies of scale that requires long development times 
(around a decade) and has low chances of success. One new vari-
ety demands almost 100,000 initial cross-fertilization events. Different 
goals—higher sucrose content, more robust roots to support bigger 
plants, or specific resistance to some diseases—trigger the development 
of new hybrid varieties, but they are always related to the objective of 
increasing productivity.
In Argentina, producers ranging from small farmers to those that 
integrate primary production with industrial facilities purchase seedlings 
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from vivariums to carry out the production process. Industrial facilities 
obtain sugar or anhydrous alcohol; the main scrap from the first crushing 
process (bagasse) is usually used to make paper, and today, anhydrous 
alcohol is frequently converted into bio-ethanol. Other sugar waste mate-
rials are used as raw material for several industries. As a result, a dense 
network arises that depends on the primary stage (sugar cane crop). This 
network currently faces strong local and international demand pressures, 
in view of the emergence of the biofuels industry.
The production of sugar cane in Argentina reaches almost 20 million 
tons yearly and covers around 330,000 hectares. Domestic sugar pro-
duction exceeded 1.9 million tons in 2010. More than 75 percent was tar-
geted to the domestic market.
The province of Tucumán is the largest sugar cane producer in 
Argentina, with 75 percent of the national area devoted to this crop, over 
two-thirds of sugar cane production, 15 of the 25 crushing mill facilities, 
and over 90 percent of sugar cane farmers. Sugar cane production is 
crucial for Tucumán’s economy, contributing almost 33 percent of the 
province’s GDP. This has historically been both a strength and a weak-
ness for the province. The main problem is that a small economy with 
a highly concentrated productive structure is highly dependent on the 
international price fluctuation of its main staple. As a result, boom-and-
bust cycles emerge with high social, political, and economic costs.
The Public-Private Collaboration Scheme: Design and Case Analysis
The Problem
Historically, the sugar industry in Tucumán has been affected by serious 
competitiveness problems. Before the PPC was established, productivity 
levels were 30 percent lower than the international average. The concern 
for productivity further increased with the emergence of new significant 
demand sources for sugar cane, such as bioethanol, and increasing com-
petition for land from other crops such as berries, lemon, sorghum, maize, 
and soybean. Several chronic diseases adversely affected productivity. 
The problem was further aggravated by the persistence of inefficient pro-
ducers with outdated technology and the failure to eliminate bad agri-
cultural practices, such as burning what was left over from yearly crops, 
which increased soil erosion and spread ash in surrounding urban areas. 
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As a result, the network suffered a typical negative externality, which 
affected the “sugar cane club” based in Tucumán.
The lack of raw materials to service new and modern industrial facili-
ties was an obstacle to catching up with modern technologies that could 
put them to better use. Today, the industrial sector works with a more 
complex production function, and there is a stronger imperative to match 
the quantity and quality of raw material flows with the rational use of 
installed capacity (production coordination problem).
But even when stakeholders know what the problems are and what 
technical solutions could solve them, individual actions are not the 
effective way to deal with them. Farmers and industrial producers have 
neither the scale needed to develop new disease-free varieties nor the 
technical capacity and skilled human resources to tackle complex sci-
entific problems. Additionally, the long time period involved in innova-
tion processes whose probability of success is low and highly uncertain, 
in a context where intellectual property rights cannot always be guar-
anteed (appropriation problem), make it difficult to achieve pure mar-
ket solutions.
Goals of Public-Private Collaboration
The goal of PPC was to increase the productivity of the sugar cane 
crop in Tucumán by developing and disseminating new technologies 
and seed varieties and solving other problems affecting the network. 
The outline of the strategy to reach these goals involved developing 
new hybrid varieties adapted to local conditions, multiplying them to 
obtain seedlings under well-designed scientific protocols and appropri-
ate agricultural procedures, and distributing them to farmers to replace 
the existing plants.
The private sector undertook the new venture in close collaboration 
with a small group of well-trained researchers in modern biotechnology 
who worked in a local R&D institution. The program was implemented 
with the participation of all institutions and stakeholders in the sugar 
cane network: the Obispo Colombres Agriculture Experimental Station 
(EEAOC), local government, and private companies. There was no master 
or strategic plan, but rather a series of specific projects with clear objec-
tives. The roles of the different actors is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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Public Sector
The provincial public sector is concerned with the sugar cane network, as 
this activity is one of the main engines of the local economy and its fluctu-
ations often have a severe social impact. In addition, the provincial govern-
ment has fiscal constraints and relatively few skilled personnel. Therefore, 
the Ministry of Production found the PPC to be a powerful public policy 
tool. Simultaneously, a specific tax on sugar cane producers (farmers and 
industrial companies) to support EEAOC activities has existed since the 
creation of the institution, and the tax rate was recently increased.
The EEAOC is a long-standing R&D institution created in 1909 to solve 
technological problems related to local crops and agribusiness activities. 
It is a self-governing institution directed by a chairman and supported by 
a private board composed of local companies involved in sugar and citrus 
fruit production that use the EEAOC’s services and pay the abovemen-
tioned tax, and a technical team. CEOs of the main sugar-producing com-
panies are part of the EEAOC’s board and they are deeply involved in its 
day-to-day affairs.
Board members serve on an ad honorem basis, which facilitates a 
commercial and technical approach to the decision-making process. 
Administrative practices, which are commonly used in the private sec-
tor, are normally employed in the management of EEAOC affairs (i.e., 
resource allocation by project, results monitoring plus process monitor-
ing, annual reports, etc.). The board establishes the goals of R&D activi-
ties, developing long-term plans, and monitors operational and financial 
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plans in weekly meetings. The governance scheme includes a technical 
director who is elected by vote and has four assistants for agricultural 
research and technology, industrial research and technology, special dis-
ciplines, and administration and services.
The EEAOC is financed by contributions from the provincial agribusi-
ness sector through a tax set at 0.03 percent of the first sales of sugar 
cane in Tucumán. The tax is collected directly by the institution, which 
reports monthly to the provincial government. The provincial government 
has also supported the institution at different times with contributions for 
infrastructure and operational needs. Other funds come from agreements 
with the productive sector, subsidies for national and international com-
petitive projects, and fees charged for the institution’s own productive and 
technical services. The most recent budget shows that around 90 percent 
of income is derived from taxation and the remainder from other sources. 
The total budget in 2010 was approximately US$12 million.
The EEAOC has some 430 people on its payroll. The institution is 
intensive in highly skilled personnel: 201 staff members are university 
professionals (including technicians, interns, and support staff); 14 have 
master’s degrees; 18 are Ph.Ds; four are in specialized fields; and 37 are 
currently enrolled in post-graduate studies. The EEAOC fosters these and 
other educational and training activities and encourages all nonprofes-
sionals to complete their secondary studies.
The organizational structure has a matrix framework, which is the 
result of several years of operation and reshaping. This structure enabled 
the new research team (focused on modern biotechnology) to integrate 
easily into the old research groups.
Private Sector – Vivarium Companies
Vivarium companies, or nurseries, are devoted to the production, distribu-
tion, and sale of seeds (or seedlings) of sugar cane and other species. They 
are small and medium-sized companies that dominate the technology of 
maintaining and transplanting plants and providing advice on agriculture 
procedures. In Tucumán, there are 20 such companies. They have com-
mercial relationships with over 5,000 sugar cane producers and are also 
connected to public R&D institutes, which supply them with seeds and tech-
nologies. The EEAOC provides seedlings to vivariums at subsidized prices.
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These companies are committed to selling only to producers located 
in Tucumán, but sometimes their sales areas go beyond the provincial 
boundaries. Operating under commercial rules—better quality, more 
sales, more profit—they spread the new technology embodied in new 
varieties of sugar cane plants. 
Crushing Mills, Energy, and Pulp and Paper Companies
In Argentina, there are about 25 sugar mills that transform sugar cane 
cuts into various products. Whereas in Salta and Jujuy the manufactur-
ing process is integrated (the mills control the whole production process), 
the Tucumán model consists of a network in which mills are fed by small 
farmers. Independent farmers produce about 65 percent of the sugar 
cane. The contractual relationship between farmers and mills consists of 
a base price and additional percentages based on quality.
There are 15 mills that manufacture sugar cane in Tucuman, four of 
which account for over 70 percent of total production. These four com-
panies produce sugar, pulp and paper, energy, and anhydrous alcohol. 
Recently, they started to set up large bio-ethanol facilities to cope with 
increasing demand.
The PPC Experience
The PPC process started in 2000, when the EEAOC board suggested the 
need for a plan aimed at improving sugar cane productivity. At that time, 
yields in the province of Tucumán were about 45 tons per hectare, signif-
icantly lower than world averages, and were even below those recorded 
in other Argentine provinces.
Until the early 2000s, conventional plant breeding developed sugar 
plant varieties. Since then, the EEAOC has been hiring professionals 
trained in biotechnology who have obtained doctoral and postdoctoral 
degrees abroad. These scientists came back to Argentina in the mid-
1990s as part of a scientist repatriation program, and they had experience 
in designing biotechnology applications in crops such as strawberries.
While the EEAOC board had initially proposed purchasing a gene 
resistant to certain diseases and introducing it into the varieties that 
it already possessed, the technicians suggested a different approach 
based on developing new disease-free varieties. This was the approach 
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chosen. The process was supported by the managers of the EEAOC, 
the biotechnology team, and the private board, or Steering Committee. 
Weekly EEAOC board and staff meetings were held. Considering 
the EEAOC’s budget constraints, additional requests for funding 
were granted by private contributions or by the provincial Ministry of 
Production. There was broad consensus among producers, EEAOC 
technicians, political authorities, and other members of the cane sugar 
network on the objectives. The strategy, developed through the PPC 
process, included five steps:
1. Develop new hybrid varieties well adapted to local conditions
2. Employ crop seedlings using modern biotechnology techniques 
under the strict control of the EEAOC
3. Transfer subsidized seedlings to the preexisting commercial network
4. Enlarge the research program to develop new varieties of transgenic 
sugar cane plants in order to establish a platform for future develop-
ment in sugar and other crops
5. Replace infected plants with the new ones.
The PPC was based on a specific division of labor. Producers would 
contribute to the development of the program through a specific local 
tax, collected and allocated by the EEAOC under the supervision of a pub-
lic-private board. Actions would be taken according to a well-designed 
technical program with a clear commercial target. The results (subsidized 
seedlings) would be disseminated using the preexisting commercial net-
work. Farmers would replace old varieties with the new ones following 
the five-year cycle and increase their yields. Hence, the PPC is based on 
technical action (generation and diffusion of new technologies) by the 
EEAOC and the creation of incentives for the private sector designed to 
increase productivity and profits.
During the process, the EEAOC had several ways to detect the needs 
and requirements of current and potential users. These included sugges-
tions and requests from members of the board; procedures and studies 
undertaken by the technical committees; customer surveys that revealed 
their problems and needs; consultations and interaction with the provin-
cial and national governments; requirements of sugar mills; suggestions 
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received from the productive sectors; and meetings and workshops 
attended by advisers, consultants, and leading producers.
PPC Performance
A decade after the network was established, over 60 percent of the old 
varieties had been replaced with new ones. The first impact was a drop 
in reported episodes of diseases. Reports by the EEAOC show an 80 per-
cent decline in the incidence of ratoon stunting disease (RSD), which led 
to major cost reductions (Figure 4.3).
In addition, sugar cane production in Tucuman passed 1.1 million tons 
per year in 2010 compared to an annual average of 800,000 tons from 
2000 to 2005. Finally, yields increased over 3 percent yearly, represent-
ing an increase from 52 tons per hectare between 2000 and 2005 to 65 
tons between 2006 and 2010 (Figure 4.4). As a result, local productivity 
is reported to be 7.8 percent above the global average.
According to the EEAOC (2012), other achievements of the PPC include:
• The recent release and registration in the National Seed Registry 
(Instituto Nacional de Semillas – INASE) of four new varieties that pres-
ent outstanding production characteristics
• Agronomic studies aimed at improving sugar cane yields
Figure 4.3    Incidence of Ratoon Stunting Disease in the Total Crop in 
Tucuman Province, 2005–2010  
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• Generation of recommendation tables regarding the contribution of 
nitrogen and phosphorus fertilization and the widespread use of liq-
uid fertilizers and bio fertilizers
• The use of satellite images to estimate the acreage and production of 
raw material in the pre-harvest stage
• The development of a technique for harvesting sugar cane without 
burning in order to promote a more environmentally friendly produc-
tion system
• Engineering design of bagasse drying equipment in pneumatic 
conveying
• Development and registration systems for different purposes: bal-
ance calculation mass and energy of an evaporation and heating sys-
tem, mass balance calculation schemes applied to sugar cooking, and 
optimization of the sequencing of the work of cooking pans
• Creation and enhancement of different labs equipped with the latest 
instruments and well-trained teams.12
12 One of these labs has been chosen by PepsiCo for sugar analysis for all of Latin 
America.
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Additionally, those involved in the PPC have begun working on other 
crops, using a similar model. The projects are designed to handle several 
genes (resistant to herbicides and/or tolerant to insects) to be introduced 
into well-performing local varieties of sugar cane. Other projects are 
dealing with soybean and maize using the same technique, considering 
that some key genetic patents were due to expire in 2014. Additionally, 
the sugar cane experience revealed the necessity to set up a technolog-
ical company under EEAOC control to capture the ongoing benefits and 
to handle the commercialization of new biotechnological events.
Conclusions and Lessons
The problem that triggered the productive development policy was the 
low average yield of sugar cane. This was related to the presence of dis-
eases that generated negative externalities affecting the entire network. 
The development of new varieties required significant amounts of fund-
ing, had high technical thresholds, and implied long innovation processes 
under conditions of uncertainty. This situation induced the key actors in 
the network to cooperate.
Private and public institutions engaged in a PPC process that was not 
based on a conventional strategic plan. The engagement of personnel and 
the mutual trust among them were basic conditions in such a process. 
Managers who had a broad view of the business knew what was happen-
ing in international markets and were aware of the importance of a scien-
tific approach to tackle production problems. R&D institutions had sound 
knowledge of genetics and biotechnology and were aware of the need for 
a commercial approach to the problems within the sugar cane network.
The heart of the strategy was to work together toward a common and 
overarching goal to which specific goals were added. The components 
were private companies (especially larger ones), the provincial Ministry 
of Production, and the EEAOC. The strategy had three key elements: 
(1) concurrent interests of public and private organizations; (2) solutions 
that had to be found in new technological developments, and (3) the 
PPC incorporating the preexisting institutional and productive network in 
order to bridge scientific discoveries and innovation.
The previously accumulated skills available at the EEAOC were com-
bined with modern biotechnology, which led to the need to restructure the 
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organizational framework. An open-mind perspective included company 
managers’ willingness to address issues related to nonprice competitive-
ness factors. Finally, the private sector’s capabilities and approach enabled 
easy communication with the public sector engaged in R&D activities.
Regarding incentives, the private sector presence in the EEAOC’s 
management was crucial to ensuring the appropriate allocation of spe-
cific funds. Incentives for private companies producing sugar cane are 
associated with productivity and profits. Vivariums profit from the bene-
fits associated with selling disease-resistant varieties. For the public sec-
tor, the program became a powerful policy tool, since the success of the 
program could reduce the cyclical social and political problems originat-
ing in the sugar cane network. Also from the EEAOC perspective, PPC 
partially solves budget constraints and reinforces its social role through 
the sale of new varieties and other services nationally and internation-
ally. PPC is based on strong pressures from private operators involved in 
monitoring expenditures, the progress of the projects, and strict indepen-
dence in the development of technical activities. The private monitoring 
model is more relevant with respect to results than process. Finally, the 
PPC experience prompted the EEAOC and other stakeholders to develop 
and launch a biotechnological platform (with capacity to handle its own 
varieties and genes) applied not only to sugar cane but also to other rel-
evant crops, such as soybeans and maize.
Buenos Aires Emprende: A Public-Private Collaboration 
Scheme that Fosters Entrepreneurship
There is growing consensus that entrepreneurial activity can strongly 
contribute to diversifying an economy, creating employment, promoting 
social mobility, and opening up new opportunities for professional suc-
cess and the emergence of innovation. In recent years, the number of 
people willing, interested, and able to create new businesses has risen 
sharply. In this context, the creation of new firms and the strengthening 
of young companies are core issues on the policy agenda. Argentina, and 
particularly the city of Buenos Aires, are emblematic of this trend.
Although nascent entrepreneurship could be a way to improve pro-
ductivity and employment, new firms face great difficulties in becoming 
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established and surviving. Informational asymmetries and uncertainty 
give rise to market failures or inefficiencies that require measures to stim-
ulate information exchange and facilitate the recognition of opportuni-
ties (Bartelsman, Scarpetta, and Schivardi, 2003; Boadway and Trenblay, 
2003; Hwang and Powell, 2005; Kantis et al., 2011; Naudé, 2010). Moreover, 
apart from the attitude of the entrepreneur and the perception of oppor-
tunities, the emergence of new firms depends on many factors, including 
macroeconomic stability, the regulatory framework, access to informa-
tion, financial support, and opportunity costs vis-à-vis expected returns 
from other activities. In addition, the social assessment of the entrepre-
neur, attitudes toward risk, the presence of role models, the availability 
of education, the culture, and the existence of an ecosystem able to sup-
port entrepreneurs are factors that have an impact on the emergence of 
the vocation to undertake new businesses (Kantis and Federico, 2007). 
Conceptually, entrepreneurship involves a wide variety of institutions, 
from educational systems to financial markets, including sociological con-
siderations, family ties, cultural background, macroeconomic institutions, 
and regulatory frameworks (Baumol, 1990; Boettke and Coyne, 2003).
Public sector intervention can help solve many of the shortcomings 
of the entrepreneurial system and expand the base of entrepreneurs by 
eliminating barriers to entry. Having said that, controversy abounds con-
cerning how entrepreneurship should be promoted (Hwang and Powell, 
2005).13 This section analyzes a productive development policy launched 
by the Undersecretary of Economic Development of the City of Buenos 
Aires aimed at fostering entrepreneurial activity. The program, called 
Buenos Aires Emprende (BAE), constitutes an interesting case of institu-
tional innovation that includes a public-private collaboration scheme to 
enhance the entrepreneurial ecosystem.
13 The existence of multiple factors affecting entrepreneurship has policy implications. 
For instance, with respect to the behavioral issues related to entrepreneurship, its pro-
motion might require a national program of social awareness to foster such behav-
iors as motivation and the propensity to take risks, and probably should be focused 
on the educational system. With respect to financial matters, the best policies would 
most likely be those aimed at breaking the vicious circle of lack of capital, savings 
and investment through the infusion of venture capital to stimulate business startups 
(Hwang and Powell, 2005).
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According to international standards, Argentina has a relatively 
high entrepreneurial activity rate. The social view of entrepreneurship 
has evolved positively in the last 10 years (Endeavor-Prosperar, 2009) 
and entrepreneurial activity has increased notably, first in the 1990s 
with the emergence of IT companies and then in the last decade due 
to the emerging opportunities created by the devaluation of the cur-
rency and economic growth. As a consequence, the country has experi-
enced unprecedented growth of entrepreneurial activity that has caught 
the attention of policymakers, academics, and entrepreneurs (Kantis, 
Federico, and Riva, 2005). In this context, there is a wide variety of pro-
grams aimed at fostering entrepreneurship both at the national and pro-
vincial levels. Not surprisingly, there is also some degree of duplication of 
effort and the consequent misallocation of resources.
The City of Buenos Aires has considerable potential to promote entre-
preneurial activity due to the existence of an educated and skilled labor 
force, appropriate physical and communication infrastructure, a big and 
sophisticated market, the availability of services, and an international rep-
utation and a growing network of incumbent institutions (nongovern-
mental organizations, private and public universities, local governments, 
incubators, etc.) dedicated to entrepreneurship. Moreover, the interest of 
policymakers in promoting entrepreneurship in the city has accompanied 
this trend and, contrary to old policies that mainly targeted vulnerable 
groups and “entrepreneurs by necessity,” the new ones are focused on 
rapid growth startups, innovative firms, and knowledge-intensive projects.
Until 2000, there was no clear strategy to foster entrepreneurship in 
Buenos Aires. The most relevant initiatives were PROMIPYME, oriented 
toward providing technical support and micro credits to low-income 
entrepreneurs, and PRUEVE, which aimed to promote entrepreneur-
ship among secondary students. In 2000, the new government fostered 
the launch of more entrepreneurial policies by creating the Metropolitan 
Center for Design and the first incubator of technology-based firms, 
BAITEC. Remarkably, the programs were not discontinued with the 
change in government in 2007. On the contrary, most entrepreneurial 
initiatives were deepened and new programs were created. To date, this 
unusual situation has strongly favored the learning process among the 
public agents and institutions involved.
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The Program
Characteristics of PPC
Buenos Aires Emprende was launched in 2008 as part of a set of policies 
to foster entrepreneurship. The institutional innovation departed from 
past efforts where pro-entrepreneurial productive development policies 
suffered from information failures that led to a limited scope of interven-
tions and the underutilization of budgetary funds. In other words, public 
agencies had serious difficulties capturing potential beneficiaries, entre-
preneurs lacked information about the existence of support programs, 
and nongovernmental organizations had scant capacity to recruit and 
assist entrepreneurs due to the shortage of funds, human resources, and 
capacity. As expected, interactions and networks were also limited.
The underlying idea of the new institutional arrangement is that PPC 
can improve the efficiency and efficacy of policies, promote the develop-
ment of networks and linkages, and foster the emergence of new insti-
tutions and strengthen existing ones. The objectives of the program are 
to multiply the scope and impact of public policies to improve capac-
ity and processes within the public sector and promote better utilization 
of financial and human resources. To achieve these goals, the initiative 
draws on the idea of intermediation or outsourcing of public policies to 
private sector sponsoring institutions, which are expected to mediate 
between the government and the entrepreneurs. Of particular note, how-
ever, is the program’s innovations in terms of its execution, insofar as it 
aims to generate a denser network of information, cooperation, and link-
ages between agents in the city’s entrepreneurial ecosystem.
The group of sponsoring institutions is comprised of a variety of 
NGOs—public and private universities, professional associations, and 
non-profit organizations dedicated to business and entrepreneurial 
affairs—with varying degrees of experience and capabilities (Figure 4.5). 
They are expected to promote the program among potential beneficia-
ries, help entrepreneurs develop their business plans by providing techni-
cal support, and present, together with the entrepreneurs, the projects to 
be evaluated by public authorities.
The Undersecretary of Economic Development is responsible for the 
evaluation and selection of the projects to be sponsored. Once the projects 
have been selected, both the entrepreneurs and the entities supporting 
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them receive a monetary subsidy to tutor the entrepreneur for one year 
and to support a portion of the startup activities. Both project execution 
and performance of the entity are closely monitored by the public agency, 
and periodic detailed reports are required. Finally, the entities must par-
ticipate in two institutions: the Network of Entrepreneurs of Buenos 
Aires (Red de Emprendedores Porteños) and the Network of Supporting 
Entrepreneurship Entities (Red de Entidades de Apoyo a Emprendedores).
Main Results of PPC14
To a large extent, the BAE has been successful in meeting its initial goals. 
Since its creation, both the number of sponsoring entities involved and 
the projects presented and subsidized have steadily grown. Sponsoring 
entities seem to have made progress in their performance. Most of 
them said that they experienced a process of “learning by doing,” which 
resulted in faster and more effective technical assistance to entrepre-
neurs. Nevertheless, sponsoring institutions pointed out some negative 
aspects of the program, specifically regarding administrative and bureau-
cratic issues. The Undersecretary of Economic Development was willing 
14 The analysis of this case is based on evidence gathered during 2012–2013. More 
recently the program has been completely transformed as new authorities were 
appointed at the Undersecretary of Economic Development.
Figure 4.5    The Buenos Aires Emprende Program


































Source: Prepared by the authors.
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to review these questions and has made some changes to take the views 
of the entities into account.
The existence of a formal opportunity for interaction between pub-
lic agencies and sponsoring institutions has facilitated the exchange of 
information, evaluation of entities, and, where necessary, review of some 
issues involved in the productive development policy. Moreover, the pub-
lic sector has been able to extract information from the entities sup-
porting the entrepreneurs as well as from other stakeholders about the 
nature, objectives, needs, and potential of the startups. Hence, the pro-
gram has helped strengthen not only the capacity of the sponsoring enti-
ties but also those of the public sector.
According to an econometric study based on a survey of BAE ben-
eficiaries, the program had a positive impact on the survival of the proj-
ects as well as sales growth. Moreover, those projects that participated in 
BAE appear to have a better administrative structure and greater access 
to markets than those that did not. Finally, public agents that were inter-
viewed for this study said that the innovative institutional arrangement 
of BAE functioned appropriately and that the program fulfilled its main 
objectives to a great extent. However, the implementation of the program 
presupposed a dramatic change in the way the public sector conceives 
and delivers policies. As expected, this required a process of adaptation 
and institutional learning.
One notable issue is that there has been a permanent effort by the 
Undersecretary of Economic Development to create opportunities for 
supervision and evaluation of the policy and the sponsoring entities. Over 
the years, this evaluation has evolved from a simple quantitative approach 
to a more complex process. 
Probably the poorest results of the program are related to the scant 
development of linkages between the sponsoring entities, and the lack of 
formalization of entrepreneurial activities within their institutional struc-
tures. The consequence is suboptimal development of formal institutions 
able to enrich the entrepreneurial ecosystem and, especially, to support 
entrepreneurial activity once the public program ends. In this sense, only 
a few sponsoring institutions routinely followed up on projects following 
BAE intervention, and, in general, this occurred only with the most prom-
ising or successful ones.
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Regarding networks, in some cases what remained was competition 
more than cooperation, especially in the recruitment of projects. This 
problem arose because there was some free-riding in the call for projects.
Case Analysis
This section will evaluate whether PPC developed under the Buenos Aires 
Emprende program contributes to the solution of the problems inherent 
in entrepreneurial activity, and will draw some lessons from the findings 
that could be translated into policy recommendations. Of particular inter-
est is the institutional strengthening objective and the relationships that 
emerged between the government, beneficiaries, and intermediary orga-
nizations as a result of this initiative.
With respect to its design, BAE was seen as an innovative way to 
address some important failures, such as the lack of information about pub-
lic policies aimed at fostering entrepreneurship, the weak dissemination and 
limited scope of those policies, the limited development of the institutional 
environment, insufficient knowledge on the part of the public sector about 
the characteristics and requirements of entrepreneurs, the lack of spillovers, 
and the lack of linkages and networks. All of these problems were exten-
sively discussed by public agencies and the entrepreneurial ecosystem, 
and some consensus was achieved. In this context, the productive develop-
ment policy incorporated a sort of PPC with the aim of strengthening not 
only entrepreneurial activity but also the incumbent institutions themselves. 
Private and public interests appeared to be aligned, although only a frac-
tion of the entities currently participating in the program were involved in 
the meetings held prior to the design of the productive development policy.
Buenos Aires Emprende is an interesting productive development 
policy initiative based on an innovative institutional arrangement that con-
stitutes a landmark in pro-entrepreneurial policies in Argentina. Contrary 
to the other cases analyzed in this study, it is a horizontal policy. Despite 
this horizontal nature, which tends to dilute the negotiating power of the 
private sector, PPC was successfully implemented thanks to broad con-
sensus about the problems that needed to be addressed and the needs 
of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. It appears that this last point was the 
cohesive element that replaced the usual sectoral agreements found in 
vertical productive development policies.
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Structure and Management
The establishment of an institutional framework of this kind required a 
detailed design process to take into account some critical issues, such as 
the types of entities chosen by the government to participate in the pro-
gram (the selection process), their degree of involvement, and the types 
of activities those entities were expected to carry out. Other relevant 
issues were the design of specific norms to govern interaction between 
the actors, the incentives and regulations to be developed to encourage 
participation in the program and avoid undesirable behavior (rent-seek-
ing), and the roles and responsibilities of each participant. This process 
was, to a great extent, facilitated by the fact that the productive devel-
opment policy was a formal program with a legal framework that allowed 
the public agency involved to make the necessary changes without delay. 
Hence, one lesson that emerges from this case is that it is important to 
develop policies within an appropriate legal and administrative frame-
work. Informal arrangements tend to generate obstacles and unneces-
sary delays in the implementation of policies.
In addition, the program demanded changes both in the established 
practices of the public sector and in the organization of human resources. 
These changes were not automatic and, in order to launch them, the 
program underwent a drastic overhaul of organizational routines. New 
administrative procedures were designed that involved the creation of 
new circuits of information, the training of personnel, and the assignment 
of new responsibilities.
Under the new arrangement, the private sector is involved in imple-
menting the policy, providing advice and assistance to entrepreneurs, and 
expanding the potential base of beneficiaries by promoting the program 
among diverse audiences. However, this involvement does not mean that 
the government has ceded its authority to make relevant decisions. On the 
contrary, while the Undersecretary of Economic Development delegated the 
recruitment and selection of potential beneficiaries and the implementation 
of some actions, such as training, it retains final decision-making authority.
Incentives
Incentives are at the core of this productive development policy. It 
appears that the right alignment of interests between the public and 
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private sectors is largely responsible for the success of the policy. In this 
sense, the program was attractive to all parties involved: the public sec-
tor, the sponsoring institutions, and entrepreneurs. Consequently, all were 
committed to the initiative from the outset.
The incentives for each party were clear:
• The productive development policy allowed sponsoring institutions 
to gain experience, acquire capabilities, and improve the skills of their 
personnel. Moreover, the economic support was, in some cases, the 
sponsoring entity’s main source of income.
• The entrepreneurs received funding to support the initial stages of 
the startup and, more importantly, technical and managerial advice 
to develop their projects. Once chosen, entrepreneurs received tech-
nical support (mentoring) for one year.
• The public sector broadened the scope of its policies and expanded 
its base of potential beneficiaries. At the same time, it met arguably 
the most important objective to strengthen institutional capacity and 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem.
With respect to the need to alleviate or minimize possible failures 
and opportunistic behavior, the incentive scheme was carefully designed. 
During this process, detailed regulations and specific safeguards were 
introduced to prevent the policy arrangement from becoming a mecha-
nism for rent-seeking. The program includes sanctions for nonfulfillment 
of obligations and a specific scheme of payments to stimulate virtuous 
behavior and give both entities and beneficiaries the right signals—that 
is, to stimulate the search for feasible and economically viable projects, 
training of entrepreneurs, and the exit of those with good ideas but inad-
equate business plans.
Funding
The financing scheme of the program is rather simple. The budget and 
the funding are entirely in the hands of the public sector. Intermediary 
institutions are expected to contribute in kind with human resources, 
infrastructure, and intangible assets such as contacts, access to markets, 
networking, and access to financing. As a counterpart, entities receive a 
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nonrefundable subsidy depending on the projects approved and men-
tored. Finally, entrepreneurs contribute more than half of the total amount 
of the project, monetarily and in kind. In our interviews, entities recog-
nized that monetary incentives are aligned with their interests, though 
some of them mentioned that the amount of the subsidy is too low to pay 
for all the services that they are expected to provide.
Financial constraints could be a problem for small sponsoring institu-
tions or for those that depend heavily on BAE to finance their activities. 
There are notable differences in the financial structures of the institutions. 
These differences, combined with a loss of funding in real terms due to 
inflation, could lead to the exit of those institutions—presumably the more 
productive ones—that are more likely to find alternative sources of funding.
Main Features of the Public Sector
To a great extent, the success of this PPC can be attributed to the char-
acteristics of the public agency in charge. The management of the 
Undersecretary of Economic Development has some particular features 
that constitute more the exception than the rule within public adminis-
tration. First, the agency appeared to be committed to the productive 
development policy and to be very receptive to making the necessary 
changes in policy when necessary. This did not lend itself to capture of 
the public sector by private agents. On the contrary, PPC showed a high 
degree of interaction and consensus-building, although all relevant deci-
sions remained under the control of the public authority.
Secondly, the bureaucracy associated with this productive develop-
ment policy was minimal compared to other government programs and 
agencies. This was due in part to the fact that the program had a legal 
framework from the beginning that granted the decision-making author-
ity to the public sector agency involved. Finally, the productive develop-
ment policy evolved in a context of political stability and low uncertainty. 
This situation reinforced commitments and fostered closer relationships 
between the public and private sectors.
Learning
As mentioned, sponsoring institutions exhibit great heterogeneity in their 
specialization, sectoral expertise, and capacity, as well as in the relevance 
178 TWO TO TANGO
of the productive development policy as a source of income. To some 
extent, these differences seem to be reflected in the uneven quality of 
projects submitted and in the quality of the assistance and training pro-
vided, but further research is needed on this topic.
Perhaps the weakest side of the PPC is the difficulty in strength-
ening the networks and linkages within the ecosystem. Although some 
measures were taken to solve this problem, the institutions interviewed 
indicated that cooperation is still more of a desire than a reality.
To conclude, we believe that the methodology adopted by this 
PPC could be applied at other levels. Presently, the Undersecretary of 
Economic Development is using the same institutional arrangement in 
other productive development policies, such as the Entrepreneurship 
Development Program and BAITEC, as well as in other policies aimed at 
strengthening small and medium-sized enterprises.
Institutional Success Factors
Six institutional success factors have been identified:
1. The right alignment of interests and appropriate incentives: The PPC 
seems to be a win-win arrangement. This reinforces the commitment 
of all parties involved.
2. Rules and flexibility: The rules of the productive development policy 
were clearly established from the beginning of the program, and they 
are transparent and explicit. The public agency had the necessary 
instruments to implement the productive development policy, and 
the bureaucratic procedures were reduced to a minimum.
3. Previous relationships: The existence of prior linkages between the 
public sector and the sponsoring institutions provided opportunities 
for interaction, exchanges of information, and brainstorming, which 
greatly facilitated the process.
4. Monitoring and evaluation: The productive development policy (and the 
PPC) is continually monitored and objectively evaluated. This procedure 
is certainly unusual in the public sector and constitutes an added value 
of the productive development policy. Moreover, these evaluations tend 
to increase competence and virtuous behavior among entities.
5. Funding scheme: Simple and transparent.
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6. Characteristics of the public sector: The public agency involved dem-
onstrated great commitment to the productive development policy. 
The existence of a skilled labor force within the public sector was also 
an important factor. A cluster of skilled public sector agents and pol-
icymakers interacted effectively with the private sector, which was a 
crucial success factor for PPC.
Public-Private Collaboration in Argentina: The Main Lessons
This chapter has discussed four cases of public-private collaboration in 
the design and implementation of productive development policies: soft-
ware, the fashion industry, sugar cane, and entrepreneurship. Table 4.1 
summarizes the main features of the cases analyzed.
The existence of a PPC scheme in the productive development policy 
cases analyzed here is somewhat of an oddity in Argentina. Furthermore, 
these PPC schemes have worked fairly well, which is even more excep-
tional in an environment that generally is not very favorable to such 
partnerships. Most of these cases have been rather immune to politi-
cal influence and have even survived changes in governments (e.g., the 
entrepreneurship case), yet another curiosity in the productive develop-
ment policy realm in Argentina.
The Impact of Productive Development Policies and the 
Contribution of PPC
To some extent, all of the cases analyzed here have met their objectives, 
and the PPC mechanism seems to have helped them do so, although 
no adequate counterfactual exists to rigorously prove this statement. 
Nonetheless, only three cases—sugar cane, software, and entrepreneur-
ship (although in this latter case the structure of the program is com-
pletely different than the original one)—remain active. The fashion PPC 
appears to have lost its momentum.
The impact of the productive development policy for sugar cane can 
include technological advances, increases in productivity and yields, qual-
ity assurance, and a lower incidence of diseases. The entrepreneurship PPC 
also had good results, especially strengthening of the entrepreneurial eco-
system, development of new capabilities within sponsoring institutions, 
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and improved survival rates of startups. Empleartec trained workers in 
the IT fields in highest demand, and the impact of this policy in terms 
of capacity-building and expansion of the skilled labor force has been 
Table 4.1 Main Features of the Cases of Public-Private Collaboration Analyzed
Software Fashion Entrepreneurship Sugar Cane
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Source: Prepared by the authors.
SUGAR CANE, SOFTWARE AND FASHION: PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION IN ARGENTINA 181
important for firms and for the IT industry as a whole. Finally, the impact 
of the fashion industry PPC can be assessed in terms of the promotion of 
a culture of consumption that values original design and thus fosters the 
design industry in the local market, the positioning of the design phenom-
enon on the public agenda, promotion of Argentine apparel design glob-
ally, and the creation of networks that bring signature fashion designers 
together. It appears that smaller productive development policies are bet-
ter at matching specific market failures with the proper policy responses.
How have public-private collaboration schemes helped advance the 
goals of productive development policies? First, they have helped the 
public sector gain access to information available in the private sector 
that otherwise would have been costly or impossible to obtain (all cases). 
Second, they have improved the diffusion of productive development 
policies among potential beneficiaries, improving their outreach (entre-
preneurship, fashion, software) and a better use of public funds. Third, 
they have generated networking mechanisms to coordinate actions and 
plans and exchange information among the different parties involved, and 
to take advantage of the division of labor and specialization (all cases). 
Fourth, they have promoted transparency through open private-public 
discussions, reducing the scope for free-riding and rent-seeking behaviors 
(entrepreneurship, software). Finally, they have strengthened resilience in 
productive development policies and, in cases where problems emerged, 
the existence of PPC has helped create alternative collaboration mech-
anisms (fashion). All of this leads us to believe that the participation of 
the private sector in productive development policies was crucial to mak-
ing them work. Moreover, the existence of the PPC schemes strengthened 
institutional and technical capacity in both the private and public sectors.
Emergence and Effectiveness of Public-Private Collaboration 
Schemes
How did the PPC schemes emerge, and why did they work? First, there 
was an alignment of interests and objectives of all parties concerned. In 
most cases, from the outset, both the public and private sectors con-
sidered cooperation an effective way to design and/or implement the 
respective policies. This consensus was further reinforced during the 
launching and implementation of the productive development policy.
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Second, there was consensus around the main problems affecting 
each sector. These included talent and human resource shortages in the 
case of the software industry; weakness of the entrepreneurial ecosys-
tem; existence of diseases and biologic constraints in the sugar cane case; 
and the need to foster the incorporation of design in the apparel indus-
try. There was also consensus on the way to manage those problems. It is 
important to highlight, in this regard, that consensus emerged on these 
issues in spite of the heterogeneity of size, interests, objectives, capabil-
ities, and market orientation of firms operating in the sectors analyzed. 
This consensus helped generate, in the more stable cases, cohesion in the 
private sector in favor of the productive development policy and public-
private cooperation. This also helped avoid wasting time and resources, 
and leveraged the commitment of public sector authorities.
Third, with regard to the leadership of the program, although the 
four cases show strong interaction between public and private sectors, 
in some of them the public sector had a greater presence in the concep-
tion and implementation of the productive development policy (entre-
preneurship), while in others the private sector was the champion of the 
policy (software). Sugar cane and fashion could be considered as mixed 
cases in this sense. In all cases, the role of leadership has been key for the 
success of the policy. This role may be assumed by a public organization 
with a qualified and committed bureaucracy, by dynamic business asso-
ciations, and/or by individual pioneers.
Fourth, the existence of previous relationships and mutual trust 
between the public sector and private agents, together with the exis-
tence of skilled people (or groups) acting as conveners, played an impor-
tant role in the success of PPC. 
Fifth, all relevant private-sector actors were involved in the PPC schemes 
through acknowledged representatives of private sector interests, such as 
large sugar cane producers and business associations. This gave legitimacy 
to the productive development policies and contributed to their success 
because the private agents involved not only had the appropriate skills but 
also had access to information not available to the public sector.
Sixth, in most of the cases, some kind of networking scheme was in 
place. In the sugar cane case, it involved the EEAOC, the provincial govern-
ment, the sugar cane producers, and the vivariums. In entrepreneurship, 
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there was the local government, the potential entrepreneurs, and the 
sponsoring institutions, with their own respective networks of mentors 
and consultants. In Empleartec, the national government, the sector’s 
business association, sponsoring firms, universities, and clusters were 
involved in the program. In the fashion industry, cooperation took place 
not only between INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer, but also involved provincial 
and local institutions that provided financial and operational support to 
the program. PPC also helped foster networking among signature design-
ers. This networking generated a division of labor in which each part of 
the network performed tasks for which it was specifically endowed, cre-
ating win-win situations for all the agents involved.
Seventh, in most (but not all) cases the participation of private actors 
was a quite open and transparent process, favoring accountability, and 
reducing room for speculative or collusive behaviors.
Eighth, in most of the cases studied the public sector had a particular 
profile fairly far from the traditional bureaucratic stereotype. In effect, the 
public sector had a high degree of commitment to the productive develop-
ment policy, a professional staff and technical skills (especially in the case 
of sugar cane), and established routines, metrics, and practices to monitor 
the performance and evolution of the policy.15 The private sector represen-
tatives were also often different from the traditional actors. In this regard, 
the business associations that participated in the software and fashion PPC 
were relatively young and well-staffed from a technical point of view.
Finally, and more tentatively, certain factors that in some cases may 
have favored the emergence and development of PPC were the relatively 
loose institutional structure of the collaboration and the often sponta-
neous ways in which the PPC emerged. In other words, the absence of 
large “master plans” and large formal committees (and the fact that the 
productive development policies analyzed were, in general, managed by 
mid-level personnel within the public sector) may have facilitated coop-
eration in several of the cases.
15 This does not mean that the public agencies involved in the productive development 
policies were necessarily the most appropriate from the point of view of the scope of 
their responsibilities and attributes, but rather that they were perhaps the most active 
or receptive to collaboration with the private sector.
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What Factors Account for the Differences in the Stability of PPC?
While most of the PPC analyzed here continues to exist, PPC in the fash-
ion industry lost intensity. It is important to examine the factors that could 
explain the lower sustainability of this case.
First, the textile and apparel value chain is comprised of very heteroge-
neous firms in terms of size, market orientation, and other characteristics. 
There were the large fabric producers that originally backed the produc-
tive development policy, but whose main interest was in obtaining trade 
protection against foreign competitors given their low degree of compet-
itiveness. There were also a number of small firms focusing on design that 
were potential clients for the fabric producers and that were, at the same 
time, a source of high-value-added exports. This second group had almost 
no relevance within the industry in terms of revenue generation.
This heterogeneity did not prevent the achievement of consen-
sus within the productive development policy. However, it became rele-
vant when the context in which the productive development policy was 
applied changed. Indeed, the establishment of the protectionist measures 
that the private sector had been pursuing, and the poorer-than-expected 
performance of design and fashion exports, contributed to eroding the 
interest of the private sector in the PPC. To some extent, this proves that 
the PPC was a secondary objective for the private sector and not a cen-
tral goal of the promoting institution (Pro-Tejer). This may have occurred 
because of the limited scope and relevance of the signature design sec-
tor within the apparel industry.
Second, in the three more stable cases, the bulk of the financing of the 
productive development policy was in the hands of the public sector. In 
sugar cane, the funding of the EEAOC came from a provincial tax on sugar 
cane activity and some other marginal fiscal sources. The cost of the tech-
nology transfer from EEAOC to the producers was borne by the public 
agency in the form of subsidies to farmers. In entrepreneurship, the pub-
lic sector supported the productive development policy through subsi-
dies, and the private sector contributed mainly with human resources and 
some infrastructure. Finally, in Empleartec, the scholarships were entirely 
financed by the Ministry of Labor, though the companies contributed with 
academic and technological advice and, in some cases, teaching hours. 
The case where the private sector financed the productive development 
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policy (fashion) was partially dismantled when the sponsoring institution 
lost interest in the outcomes of the policy. However, although the fact that 
the public sector was the main funder of the productive development pol-
icy may have contributed to its stability, it also made the policy dependent 
on fiscal constraints and/or changes in administration.
Involvement of the Public and Private Sectors, Co-governance, 
and Monitoring 
Although there was not complete co-governance in all of the cases stud-
ied, three of them had some degree of co-governance (or strong private-
public interaction) that deserves particular attention: entrepreneurship, 
Empleartec (software), and sugar cane. In the entrepreneurship case, the 
public sector delegated the execution of part of the policy to the private 
sector (sponsoring institutions), without forfeiting its rights and duties. 
The public sector in this case was essentially outsourcing, with the inter-
esting particularity that private, independent organizations benefited by 
enhancing their capacity and networks. In the case of Empleartec, there 
was a clear and explicit collaborative effort between the public and pri-
vate sectors to achieve the objectives of the productive development 
policy and carry out co-governance in the decision-making process on 
issues such as the types of courses to be offered and the target audi-
ences. Finally, in sugar cane, the EEAOC had a board made up of repre-
sentatives of the public and private sectors, which defined its main goals 
and policies and monitored execution of the productive development 
policy. In all of these cases, there were formal agreements and contracts 
defining the duties and responsibilities of the organizations involved.
The fashion case, on the contrary, had no formal co-governance 
mechanism in place, although the private sector had the same share of 
control over the Por la Calle (“On the Street”) Program as the public sec-
tor. There are no formal agreements like those in the other cases.
The level of involvement of the private sector in the productive devel-
opment policy is another relevant issue. In the Empleartec case, in addition 
to deciding jointly with the public sector the general orientation of the pro-
gram and the areas where the courses would be offered, the private sec-
tor defined the curricula and course contents, as well as teaching materials 
and venues. In the sugar cane case, the private sector had an active role in 
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day-to-day activities as well as in the strategic management of the EEAOC. 
In the fashion industry, the private sector not only financed but also jointly 
designed and implemented the Por la Calle Program with INTI Textiles. In 
the entrepreneurship case, the role of the private sector was less promi-
nent, since the sponsoring institutions only promoted the program, pro-
posed candidates for the subsidies, and granted technical assistance to the 
projects selected. The fact that the private sector appears to have been 
more heavily involved in the more stable cases of productive develop-
ment policies or in participating in a kind of formal co-governance mech-
anism does not mean that the public sector ceded its authority. Moreover, 
although in some cases the private sector initiated the productive devel-
opment policy, in all cases the policies adopted were in line with previously 
and autonomously defined objectives and interests of the public sector.
Finally, in theory, to be successful, PPC schemes require some degree 
of monitoring and evaluation of their main variables, including perfor-
mance, attainment of established objectives and agreements, use of 
resources, and the emergence of free-riding and rent-seeking behaviors. 
However, only the entrepreneurship case had explicit metrics to mea-
sure the performance of the policy and mechanisms established to eval-
uate the results of the public-private interaction.16 This is not surprising, 
given that public policies are not evaluated very frequently in Argentina. 
However, this does not mean that the other more stable programs had 
no monitoring mechanisms at all. Their continuity was the result of more 
formal or informal evaluations that suggested that the respective poli-
cies were successful in terms of attaining their original objectives. There 
are examples of (low-cost) learning and policy changes thanks to those 
mechanisms. In the software program, for example, the government 
pushed for the inclusion of courses related not only to the technolog-
ical areas in which the large sponsoring firms operate but also to the 
needs of small and medium-sized enterprises, and to reduce the digital 
gap through courses on basic IT principles. This means that a “learning by 
monitoring” process took place in some of the cases.
16 We could say that, at least in some cases, the public sector “imported” management 
techniques originally devised by the private sector.
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Some Shared Shortcomings and Spillovers
Apart from their differing degrees of success and stability, the cases stud-
ied have some common shortcomings:
1. Difficulties coordinating with other public agencies: In most of the 
cases, the problems of productive development policies involve a 
number of different issues, and the public sector officials involved do 
not always have the authority to solve them. This may occur because 
the agencies are local and not only lack the authority to decide on 
national issues but also are unable to coordinate actions with the 
national agencies (e.g., entrepreneurship, sugar cane). In other cases, 
this occurs because although the public agency has a national scope, 
the sectoral policy is decided at a higher level, reducing the influence 
of the productive development policy and its attractiveness for the 
private sector (e.g., apparel). In the case of software, the new phase 
of the program aims to establish contacts with other agencies that 
are in charge of the sectoral policy, but the success of this aim has 
yet to be seen.
2. Although the analysis in this chapter suggests that PPC may be help-
ful in implementing productive development policies, most of the 
cases were exposed to instability and uncertainty about their future 
development. Such uncertainty has characterized public policies in 
Argentina in recent decades. No mechanisms aimed at making the 
PPC permanent have been put in place beyond the fact that in all of 
them, private constituencies have emerged that may lobby for their 
continuity. However, in some cases, the programs may end because 
their objectives have been met. In the entrepreneurship case, for 
example, it is expected that the entrepreneurial ecosystem may 
reach at some point in time a sufficient degree of maturity to gener-
ate access to credits for new ventures.17
17 To some extent, this might be the case of the Por la Calle Program, since the idea 
that design capabilities exist in the city of Buenos Aires has already been established. 
A new program was launched, without private funding, aimed at promoting the same 
concept in other regions of Argentina.
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Some positive spillovers have also emerged that transcend the orig-
inal aims of the productive development policies. These include the 
following:
1. Some PPC has given rise to the creation of formal or informal oppor-
tunities for the exchange of information and discussion of other 
issues relevant to their respective sectors. This, in turn, may lead to 
new policy initiatives. Cases in point are fashion (with the National 
Design Survey), and software and sugar cane (where new technolog-
ical developments and an ongoing technical platform were launched 
as a consequence of PPC).
2. The programs have created externalities for the organizations 
involved. For instance, the universities and software clusters that 
teach the Empleartec courses gain in terms of reputation, legitimacy, 
and institutional strengthening. The same occurred in the sugar 
cane case with the EEAOC, and in the fashion design case with INTI 
Textiles. This occurred with the entrepreneurship productive devel-
opment policy as well, but in that case it was a policy objective. In 
the case of entrepreneurship, there were spillovers for all institutions 
dedicated to the promotion of new entrepreneurs, as well as for the 
very few organizations granting credits to startups, since the pro-
gram led to an increase in the volume of new projects. In the case 
of EEAOC, an important externality was the adoption of a new tech-
nological platform to be used to develop innovations in other crops.
